Falun Gong Practitioners Systematically Murdered for Their Organs: Refuting the Chinese Regime’s “Death Row” Explanation, Chapter VII

by Ouyang Fei, Sun Sixian, Lin Zhanxiang

(Clearwisdom.net) In 2006, The Epoch Times newspaper broke a stunning story about what is undoubtedly one of the most horrible atrocities to be committed by any government, not only in modern times, but in all of recorded history. As documented in the investigative report, “Bloody Harvest,” by noted human rights lawyer David Matas and former Canadian Secretary of State for the Asia-Pacific region David Kilgour, there is overwhelming evidence of the Chinese Communist regime’s chilling role in systematically murdering Falun Gong practitioners, harvesting their organs while they are alive, and making huge profits from doing so. In response to the international outcry, the Chinese regime has attempted to explain away one of the main pieces of circumstantial evidence–the meteoric rise in the number of organ transplantations in recent years and the extremely short wait times in a culture notoriously averse to organ donation–by stating that it has harvested organs from executed criminals after their deaths. Faced with undeniable evidence, it has attempted to escape culpability for a monstrous atrocity by admitting to a lesser crime. In this report, we will show evidence that directly contradicts this claim and lends further credence to the serious charges leveled against the Chinese regime.

VII. Sources of extra organs

If the annual number of organs from death row inmates is around 6,000, and with the number of relatives willing to be donors very limited between 2003 and 2006, where did all the extra organs come from to supply the more than 12,000–and as many as 20,000–organ transplants per year?

1. Features that likely characterize the new source of organs

  1. The number of people that make up the donor supply base is larger than the number of current death row inmates.
  2. Because this is an illegal undertaking, the donors need to be readily accessible and just as readily hidden once outsiders discover the new source of organs.
  3. Despite the illegalities involved, the participants bear no legal consequences. In other words, current government policies tolerate the exploitation of this source of organs. Harvesting organs from this source would be “turning waste into a useful thing.”
  4. These individuals need to be held in large numbers in given locations to increase the probability of organ matching.
  5. Last but not least, doctors bear no legal responsibility or moral obligation for killing these people for their organs.

2. Illegally detained Falun Gong practitioners – a new source of organs

Using death row organs requires legal authorization. Hospitals cannot casually go to a prison and harvest organs from death row inmates. But what about a group that is outside the justice system and is being suppressed and defamed by the government? And what if there is an illegally detainedsizable population of that group? The possibility of this group being an ideal live organ supply base is very high. In particular, organ transplant hospitals for the army and armed police forces would view this as an ideal source. So which suppressed group fits this category?

Since the persecution of Falun Gong began on July 20, 1999, a large number of Falun Gong practitioners have been detained. These detained practitioners were quickly viewed as an ideal source of organs because:

  1. They fall outside the justice system. Many practitioners are sent to forced labor camps without due process. Many practitioners who go to appeal for Falun Gong do not reveal their names and address to protect their families as well as to avoid implicating their workplaces. These practitioners are detained in large, concentrated numbers.
  2. They represent a huge supply base. Practitioners are detained for no other reason than to be persecuted and executed. As a result, the waiting period for organs can be shortened to 1-2 weeks–a most attractive feature that has allowed China to become a center for global organ transplant tourism.
  3. They are available for live organ donations. Live organs are always far better than organs from cadavers and are always the most sought-after by overseas patients who are willing to pay a premium. Use of live organs in transplants also increases the survival rate of patients; this means a live source is attractive to Chinese transplant doctors who are interested in furthering their careers.
  4. The quality of their organs is very high. Contrary to most death row inmates who are addicted to alcohol, cigarettes, and drugs, Falun Gong practitioners are required to refrain from such substances and are generally very healthy. In particular, young practitioners from rural areas are thought to have become a key target for live organ harvesting.

3. Uncertain whereabouts of many Falun Gong practitioners

Since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-led campaign against Falun Gong started, practitioners have regularly visited local and Beijing government appeal offices or unfurled banners in Tiananmen Square to draw the world’s attention to the violations of Falun Gong practitioners’ human rights. The report “The Journey of Falun Dafa: A Bright But Arduous Path” on the Minghui/Clearwisdom website states, “According to internal information from the Public Security Bureau in Beijing, by the end of April 2001 there had been a total of 830,000 arrests of Falun Gong practitioners for appealing in Beijing for the right to practice Falun Dafa. This number does not include those who refused to give their names or were not recorded by the police at the time of arrest.” [38] In its “2008 Human Rights Report: China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),” the U.S. Department of State stated, “Some foreign observers estimated that Falun Gong adherents constituted at least half of the 250,000 officially recorded inmates in RTL camps, while Falun Gong sources overseas placed the number even higher.” [39]

The CCP adds “implication of workplace” to the ancient practice of “implication of the nine generations of a family”

A phenomenon worth mentioning here is that the CCP has adopted a vicious implication policy in its persecution of Falun Gong practitioners. Members of a practitioner’s family can be fired from their jobs; supervisors at the person’s workplace can be punished; co-workers can lose their bonuses; in some cases, even local government officials can lose their positions. Through this policy, the CCP isolates Falun Gong practitioners and turns everyone against them. As a result, others are more willing to participate in the persecution. Those who previously sympathized with Falun Gong become resentful when they lose their bonuses, and local government officials do everything they can to prevent Falun Gong practitioners from going to Beijing to appeal so they can save their positions. Local public security members have been dispatched to Beijing to stop local practitioners from appealing to the Central Office of Letters and Calls; the Beijing Office of the local government has turned into a police station to arrest and detain Falun Gong practitioners who have gone to Beijing.

Many Falun Gong practitioners who refused to reveal their names and addresses went missing

Many practitioners who went to appeal refused to reveal their names and addresses to the authorities. Based on practitioners’ sharing articles on the Minghui website, resisting the demands to reveal identity and location became a common practice. What has happened to these practitioners? Many of them went missing and likely were detained in large concentration camps. In hindsight, the detention of these practitioners in large numbers would have helped facilitate large scale live organ harvesting.

In their book, Bloody Harvest, The killing of the Falun Gong for their organs, authors David Matas and David Kilgour interviewed many Falun Gong practitioners around the world who had been detained in China. These practitioners all mentioned that they had met many practitioners in detention centers who refused to reveal their names and addresses, and they eventually went missing. At the same time, many of the missing practitioners’ families did not know that these practitioners had gone to appeal for Falun Gong and therefore had no idea of their whereabouts. The harsh reality is they do not know where to find their loved ones.

Guo Guoting, a Chinese lawyer living overseas, confirmed that one of his clients, Huang Xiong, whom he represented while he was in Shanghai, was in a similar situation. Huang Xiong went missing from his dorm in Shanghai Jiao Tong University, and his whereabouts remain unknown.

In “New Leads in the Investigation of the Sujiatun Concentration Camp,” a practitioner stated, “After December 20, 2000, the number of practitioners sent to detention centers suddenly increased to dozens or even over a hundred each day, whereas previously only about one dozen practitioners would be sent there… All practitioners were assigned a number… Within a few days the cells were full. The guards interrogated them each day and asked for their names. They used electric batons and other forms of torture on the practitioners and also encouraged the inmates to beat the practitioners. Most of the practitioners still refused to tell their names. The guards finally stopped asking and said, ‘Ok, if you refuse to tell me, I’ll send you to a place where you will tell.’

“In early 2001, groups of practitioners were sent away in big buses in the early morning every other day. An 18-year-old girl from Shandong Province shared the same cell with me. Her number was K28. One morning her number was called by mistake. She got on the bus but later returned. She said all of the practitioners were being taken to northeastern China. Later, the guards openly told us that they were sending the practitioners to northeastern China. During that period, many of them were sent there from Beijing.” [40]

Existence of “Concentration Camps”

An insider who worked in a mainland Procuratorate once told us that no forced labor camp or prison in China would detain an inmate who did not have a name or address for long because they could not complete the registration process. These inmates would be transferred to other locations.

Then what happened to those missing Falun Gong practitioners? In March 2006, a whistleblower alerted the world to the possibility of live organ harvesting from Falun Gong practitioners at the Sujiatun Detention Center in Shenyang City, Liaoning Province. Thus, a potential new source of organs was identified.

Shortly afterward, the word “Concentration Camp” began to appear in media reports to describe the facilities where a large number of Falun Gong practitioners were detained.

According to practitioners who were released from the detention centers and the forced labor camps, some detained practitioners who were extremely firm in their belief and refused to be “transformed” were transferred to unknown locations. The existence of the concentration camps provided a possible clue to their whereabouts.

Military-controlled concentration camps

Since the judicial system cannot accept inmates without names or addresses, based on the CCP’s usual practice, they would likely let the military take over these cases. According to sources inside the CCP, concentration camps are directly linked to military-controlled areas.

After the allegation of live organ harvesting of Falun Gong practitioners was made public in March 2006, a senior military doctor in the logistics service in the army in Shenyang Military Zone wrote to The Epoch Times and revealed that there were several dozen of such concentration camps around China. He further reminded the outside world to pay attention to military facilities, because organ transplants were being administrated by the military, implying that many military facilities were being used as concentration camps. [41]

The advantages of having the military in charge of the source of organs will be elaborated on in later sections.

4. Blood testing of detained Falun Gong practitioners

Some Chinese prisons have a regulation to provide “periodic physical exams” for inmates. In reality that is hard to carry out. However, the health checklist for Falun Gong inmates is different from the one used for regular inmates. According to a 2004 Xinhuanet website report on the Shanghai Tilanqiao Prison, common physical exam items for regular inmates included “taking blood pressure, listening to the heart and lungs, palpating the liver and spleen area, and taking chest X-rays,” which would cost roughly 60 yuan. [42] Blood tests are not done routinely on regular inmates. For detained practitioners, on the other hand, blood tests, which are a key step in organ matching, were very common.

In July 2009, during the taping of “Between Life and Death,” New Tang Dynasty Television (NTDTV) interviewed several practitioners who had undergone such blood tests during their detention.

Ms. Gan Na, who currently lives in Toronto, Canada, was from Beijing. She was a former customs official at the Beijing Airport. In 2001, when she was detained for the third time at the Xin’an Women’s Forced Labor Camp, she was given a blood test, X-rays, an electrocardiograph test, and eye exams. She told NTDTV, “It seemed very strange to me at the time. The guards at the forced labor camp had never treated us like we were human, yet we were given this thorough physical exam. It felt very strange.”

Ms. Zhang Yijie, former director of the Foreign Affairs Office of the International Division of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC), was detained seven times for practicing Falun Gong. The last time she was detained was in June 2001, when she was held at the Beijing Women’s Forced Labor Camp. Ms. Zhang said, “MOFTEC used to offer cadres one physical exam every six months. For a routine liver function exam, usually they took a small tube of blood. The amount of blood they took was pretty consistent. But they took more than the usual amount of blood for the blood test in the forced labor camp. We all asked why they took so much blood.”

In January 2000, Ms. Zou Yuyun from Guangzhou was taken to Chatou Women’s Forced Labor Camp in Guangzhou, where she was detained for 22 months. After she was released from the labor camp, she was arrested and detained in five different brainwashing centers. Ms. Zou told NTDTV, “I was eventually transferred to the brainwashing center in the Tianhe District in Guangzhou. The doctor there took me to the hospital specifically for a very thorough physical exam. They did an electroencephalograph test, and, of course, a blood test, on me.”

In Bloody Harvest, authors Matas and Kilgour also interviewed several Falun Gong practitioners who had been detained in China regarding the blood test issue. The blood testing and the physical exams are a puzzling issue for those who had firsthand experience. On the one hand, practitioners were subjected to inhumane torture and mistreatment while in detention. They were pressured to denounce Falun Gong and to sign statements to quit the practice. Since the “transformation” rate is directly linked to the political accomplishments of the local government, torture is commonly used on practitioners, many of whom have been tortured to death. On the other hand, the authorities also carried out systematic blood testing and physical exams on practitioners. Many practitioners have mentioned that the blood testing specifically targeted Falun Gong practitioners. What is more suspicious is that if, indeed, they found any health problem during the physical exam, the authorities would leave that practitioner alone instead of providing medical treatment. In other words, the physical exam was used to find healthy practitioners.

So far we have only gathered information on blood testing in forced labor camps and prisons. We have no information on the practitioners who were put in concentrated detention in undisclosed locations.

5. Detained Falun Gong practitioners – a reservoir for large-scale matching and live organ harvesting

We mentioned earlier that, in principle, in any given location at any given time, the organs from executed death row inmates can only be matched with the patients in that specific location at that specific time. Soon after death row inmates are executed, the organs are no longer usable. As an organ source, they have limitations, because executions take place in different locations at different times. Without an organ sharing system, death row organ matching is a “small sampling” process.

Detained Falun Gong practitioners, on the contrary, can be matched multiple times until a proper match is found. They are a “reserve resource.” At the same time, a large number of them have been detained in concentration in several undisclosed locations in China, so they are also a “large sampling resource.”

More importantly, the harvesting of organs from living Falun Gong practitioners provides an explanation for all the unique features of the organ transplant market in China between 2003 and 2006.

6. Bypassing “the courts” in the handling of Falun Gong practitioners to facilitate organ harvesting

A key player in using organs from executed death row inmates is the court, which is left out of the process in handling of Falun Gong practitioners, many of whom have been sent to forced labor camps or detained in concentration camps without due process. In addition, CCP authorities discourage Chinese lawyers from representing Falun Gong practitioners, thereby cutting out the judicial system. The practice of harvesting organs from living Falun Gong practitioners thus bypasses the courts and is handled directly between the hospitals and the detention facilities. The consequences are grave:

  1. Without the involvement of the courts, Falun Gong practitioners potentially become a large, unrestricted source of organs.
  2. Without court involvement, hospitals or organ intermediaries deal with the detention facilities directly, without the need to go through any legal procedures or the inconvenience of having to harvest the organ at the site of an execution. The process is much more efficient .
  3. Without court involvement, the perpetrators are worry free. Going through legal procedures means that cases are handled out in the open, subject to restrictions from the outside as well as the families of the donors. The fact that the whereabouts of detained Falun Gong practitioners are unknown to their families makes them easy targets.

A point of clarification: The lack of court involvement only means that there is no legal protection for Falun Gong practitioners while they are being persecuted. It does not mean that the courts have not participated in the live organ harvesting.

Based on available media reports, we have illustrated the following flowchart, which shows the process of live organ harvesting of Falun Gong practitioners:

7. Live organ harvesting of Falun Gong practitioners follows the “military driven model”

A key feature in the harvesting of organs from living practitioners is that the source of organs is controlled by the military and the participating hospitals are dominated by the military or those that have close ties to the military. Due to the nature of military security, the truth is concealed from the outside world.

China has a vast military medical system. There is the General Hospital of the PLA, and each military medical university has its own affiliated hospital. The various branches of the military all have their own hospitals. Organ transplantation is one of the most rapidly developing fields in the military hospitals. Zhang Yanling, Minister of Health of the General Logistics Department of the PLA and former president of the Second Military Medical University, was quoted in a December 17, 2008, article on the Xinhuanet website: “In 1978, there were only three hospitals in the military that could perform kidney transplants. Now there are 40 hospitals in the military that can perform liver, kidney, heart, lung, and multiple organ transplants. This is one quarter of the national total.” [43]

The most important enabler for the big leap in military organ transplants has been the control of organ resources.

Life Week magazine reported in April 2006: “98 percent of China’s supply of organs is controlled by systems outside the Ministry of Health.” In fact, whether it is harvesting organs from executed death row inmates or the harvesting of organs from living Falun Gong practitioners, military hospitals, including armed police hospitals, have the advantage. The non-military hospitals that do large-scale organ transplants all have close ties to military hospitals. In many cases their organ transplant surgeons are from military hospitals.

Military and Armed Police Forces hospitals, as well as hospitals along China’s coastline, are the primary impetus behind live organ harvesting

After enjoying rapid growth over a short period of time, the former organ transplant center in the Tianjin No. 1 Central Hospital changed its name to the Oriental Organ Transplant Center, which is the largest in Asia. In 2003, Shen Zhongyang founded the “Liver Transplant Research Institute of the Armed Police Forces” in the General Hospital of Armed Police Forces in Beijing and became its first director. The fact that Shen Zhongyang (and the several transplant facilities he manages) has ready access to organ supplies is largely because this facility is part of the armed police forces.

Shi Bingyi is another key figure that is very active in China’s organ transplant community and often in the media spotlight. He is the director of the Organ Transplant Center of the PLA, which is located in the General Hospital of the General Staff of the PLA, also known as the 309th Hospital.

In Bloody Harvest, Matas and Kilgour interviewed several patients who went to China for organ transplants. The surgeons of these patients all had military backgrounds. One of the patients was admitted at the Shanghai No. 1 People’s Hospital. His surgeon was Dr. Tan Jianming, who is the chief surgeon of the Fuzhou General Hospital of the Nanjing Military Region (formerly known as the 93rdHospital). Tan also does surgeries at the PLA’s 85th Hospital of the Nanjing Military Region in Shanghai.

Another patient went first to Huashan Hospital in Shanghai (affiliated with Fudan University) for a liver transplant. He was placed under the care of Qian Jianmin, deputy director of the liver center at Huashan Hospital. When no matching organ could be found after several days, Qian suggested that he be transferred to Changzheng Hospital in Shanghai, which is affiliated with Second Military Medical University, saying that it was easier to get organs there. A matching liver was found for the patient on the day he transferred to Changzheng Hospital.

The authors also interviewed a patient who went to the Taiping People’s Hospital in Dongguan City, Guangdong Province, for a kidney transplant. His surgeon was Dr. Gao Wei. Taiping People’s Hospital is a non-military general hospital, but Dr. Gao Wei is also a doctor at the Kidney Transplant Department in Zhujiang Hospital, which is affiliated with First Military Medical University. Dr. Gao is also a part-time surgeon at the Shenzhen Armed Police Forces Coastguard Hospital in Guangdong Province.

Sound of Hope Radio interviewed Dr. Peng Xuemei in September 2009. Dr. Peng works at the Anesthesiology Department in the Guangzhou Overseas Chinese Hospital and assists in organ transplant surgeries. Dr. Peng revealed that the hospital had many channels through which it could get organs. She said, “In many cases, Nanfang Hospital would get the kidneys first and then send them to our hospital. That’s why I said there are many channels. But we can’t discuss this openly.” Nanfang Hospital is the first affiliated hospital of Southern Medical University, which is the former First Military Medical University, which was handed over to the Guangdong provincial government in 2004.

In August 2008, the Minister of Health in China launched the “Chinese Scientific Registry of Kidney Transplantation,” or CSRKT (www.csrkt.org). Its data center is run by the 309th Hospital. This gives us a clear idea of the role military hospitals play in China’s organ transplant community.

As China became the center for global organ transplant tourism, hospitals along China’s coastline were particularly favored for their location. Having attracted a growing number of patients, they needed to develop more channels for organ supplies. The organ intermediaries for these hospitals would do all they could to establish close ties to military hospitals or hospitals with a military background.

Although the outside world knows little about how the military conducts live organ harvesting, the active roles the military and armed police forces hospitals play in the organ transplant market and their advantage over organ supplies is the result of the control it has over the concentration camps and associated organ sources.

8. Additional open questions

Story behind the “Kidney for Sale” advertisement

While on the topic of organ resources, some readers may have seen a “Kidney for Sale” advertisement posted on utility poles. How big of a market can these donors, who are advertising one of their kidneys to make a living, create?

First of all, this type of organ trade is illegal. Those involved can be sentenced to jail. The potential kidney sellers are taking advantage of a legal loophole regarding live donors among relatives. In this case, the seller would need to forge a document to prove that the donor and the recipient are related. It is risky business, but the high profits have driven this widespread behavior. On January 14, 2004, the Xinhuanet website posted a report from the Morning News. The report said that restrooms in hospital wards were where most of the “Kidney for Sale” ads were posted. One nurse told the reporter, “There are ‘Kidney for Donation,’ ‘Kidney for Sale’ ads all over the place. They cannot be washed off with water and have to scraped off. There is nothing we can do to stop them.” [44]

Another question is how many of these people successfully sold their kidneys. In reality, the probability of organ matching remains the biggest issue. Experts have stated, “The chances for two complete strangers to meet by accident and have matching organs are rare, unless the parties have done good preparation prior to hospital tests. But there exists another hurdle–no Chinese doctor would encourage or even get involved with this type of underground trade because it is illegal.” [45]

Some doctors stated that the costs to harvest organs from executed death row inmates are low, and the process takes only a few minutes. In addition, there is no need to pay the donors, nor is there a need for post-procurement medical care for the donors (similar in the cases of live organ harvesting of Falun Gong practitioners). On the other hand, the cost to purchase a kidney from a private seller would be much higher. Not only does it cost between 10,000 and 30,000 yuan for one kidney, post-organ donation medical care, such as a hospital stay, also needs to be provided to the seller. In an interview with Huashang Newspaper in late 2004, Wu Gang, associate professor of the Organ Transplant Department at the First Hospital of China Medical University, told the reporter, “To rashly purchase kidneys illegally from total strangers solely based on ads is to risk losing money and wasting time on unusable organs.” [46]

We should state that illegal kidney sales do exist, and there are people who have obtained kidneys through this channel. Nevertheless, it cannot be a sizable organ resource. Even the Chinese government admitted that the growth in China’s organ transplant market is largely driven by the huge profits in this market. The introduction of private sellers’ organs would increase costs, especially in comparison to organs harvested for free with no post-procurement medical care, and reduce the hospital’s bottom line. AAlthough “Kidney for Sale” ads are found in many areas, private kidney sellers as organ resources cannot drive the “vigorous development” of China’s organ transplant market. More importantly, between 2003 and 2006, detained Falun Gong practitioners provided a better source of organs. Wu Gang also revealed in the 2004 interview, “There is no market for those ‘Kidney for Sale’ ads because currently there are plenty of kidneys in Shenyang City!”

The China International Transplantation Network Assistance Center, or CITNAC, which is under the First Hospital of China Medical University, claimed on its website that the shortest waiting period for a kidney was one week, with an average waiting period of less than a month. If the surgery failed, a second surgery could be scheduled within a week. It also claimed that the waiting period for a liver was less than one month. (See Appendix 7) Where did these abundant organs come from? Obviously not from the “Kidney for Sale” ads posted on utility poles or in hospital restrooms. We also should note that, between 2003 and 2006, liver transplants increased significantly while few “Liver for Sale” ads were seen.

Starting in 2007, the source of organs from large-scale harvesting of organs from living Falun Gong practitioners began to disappear or decline. In order to develop a new source of organs, the Chinese government has launched vigorous propaganda campaigns to promote live donors among relatives. This might have opened a door for forged relationships and stimulated more rampant underground kidney trading, but this is a different issue. The focus of this report is on the period between 2003 and 2006, when China’s organ transplant market skyrocketed.

Can the increase in the number of organ transplant hospitals drive the increase in organ transplants?

Some may wonder whether the big increase in the number of organ transplant hospitals was the cause of the big increase in the number of organ transplants. This is not the case. The shortage of organ supplies is the greatest bottleneck for organ transplants. If the supply of organs could not even satisfy a smaller number of hospitals, the increase in the number of hospitals would only worsen the situation instead of creating more donors. Furthermore, according to the estimation formula we discussed in previous sections, the number of organs from executed death row inmates is fixed. An increase in the number of hospitals simply cannot produce more donors.

[38] Clearwisdom.net, “The Journey of Falun Dafa: A Bright But Arduous Path,”http://www.clearwisdom.net/emh/articles/2004/9/26/52823.html

[39] U.S. Department of State, 2008 Human Rights Report: China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), February 25, 2009, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eap/119037.htm

[40] Clearwisdom.net, “New Leads in the Investigation of the Sujiatun Concentration Camp,”http://www.clearwisdom.net/emh/articles/2006/3/22/71075.html

[41] The Epoch Times, “Military Doctor Reveals the Official Process of the CCP’s Stealing and Selling of Organs from Live Falun Gong Practitioners,” http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/6/4/30/n1303902.htm

[42] Xinhua Net, “Hearing of Commutation Cases Is a Beneficial Exploration,”http://news.xinhuanet.com/comments/2004-06/10/content_1518473.htm

[43] Xinhua Net, “Thirty Years of a Big Leap in Chinese Military Health Care Condensed in Seven Groups of Data,” http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-12/17/content_10520230.htm

[44] Morning News, “Kidney for Sale Ads Taking Advantage of Internet, Shanghai Government Trying to Cut Underground Chain of Kidney Trade,” http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2004-01/14/content_1274416.htm

[45] Sina News Center, “Illegal Kidney Trading Rampant in Shanghai, Black Market Built on Legal Loophole,” http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2004-01-14/15361586708s.shtml

[46] Huashang Newspaper, “Hospitals Infested with Organ for Sale Ads, Doctor Claims Shenyang Has Plenty of Kidneys,” http://news.hsw.cn/gb/news/2004-12/24/content_1520547.htm

 

Falun Gong Practitioners Systematically Murdered for Their Organs: Refuting the Chinese Regime’s “Death Row” Explanation, Chapter VI

by Ouyang Fei, Sun Sixian, Lin Zhanxiang

(Clearwisdom.net) In 2006, The Epoch Times newspaper broke a stunning story about what is undoubtedly one of the most horrible atrocities to be committed by any government, not only in modern times, but in all of recorded history. As documented in the investigative report, “Bloody Harvest,” by noted human rights lawyer David Matas and former Canadian Secretary of State for the Asia-Pacific region David Kilgour, there is overwhelming evidence of the Chinese Communist regime’s chilling role in systematically murdering Falun Gong practitioners, harvesting their organs while they are alive, and making huge profits from doing so. In response to the international outcry, the Chinese regime has attempted to explain away one of the main pieces of circumstantial evidence–the meteoric rise in the number of organ transplantations in recent years and the extremely short wait times in a culture notoriously averse to organ donation–by stating that it has harvested organs from executed criminals after their deaths. Faced with undeniable evidence, it has attempted to escape culpability for a monstrous atrocity by admitting to a lesser crime. In this report, we will show evidence that directly contradicts this claim and lends further credence to the serious charges leveled against the Chinese regime.

Unprecedented market conditions for organ transplants between 2003 and 2006

By now, the readers may ask: Where did all the extra organs come from? Let us take a look at some unique features of the organ transplant market in China between 2003 and 2006.

1. Extraordinarily short waiting periods previously unseen

According to data published by the United States Department of Health and Human Services, the average waiting period for organs in the U.S. is two years for a liver and three years for a kidney. [27] In China, the waiting period for these organs at some hospitals is calculated in weeks.


The following table shows the average waiting period for organs published by three major organ transplant centers in China during the period of 2003 and 2006 versus that in the U.S. Such an extraordinarily short waiting period points to an extraordinary source of organs.

Average Waiting Period for Organs in China and the U.S.

Oriental Organ Transplant Center

(Tianjin No. 1 Central Hospital)

Organ Transplant Institute of the People’s Liberation Army

(Shanghai Changzheng Hospital)

CITNAC, China International Transplantation Network Assistance Center

(The First Hospital of China Medical University in Shenyang)

U.S. data fromhttp://www.organdonor.gov
Average Waiting Period 2 weeks 1 week for a liver transplant 1-2 months for a liver.

1 week to 1 month for a kidney. If 1stsurgery fails, 2nd surgery within 1 week.

(Liver 2 yrs; Kidney 3 yrs)

230 days for a heart

501 days for a pancreas

796 days for a liver

1,068 days for a lung

1,121 days for a kidney

 

(Source: See Appendix 7)

2. Expensive fees make organ transplants tremendously profitable

While fees for organ transplants vary between different hospitals, they are high across the board. Here is an example of fees for different organ transplants published by CITNAC.

Fees for Organ Transplants (U.S. Dollars)

Kidney transplant $62,000
Liver transplant $98,000 – $130,000
Liver and kidney transplant $160,000 – $180,000
Kidney and pancreas transplant $150,000
Lung transplant $150,000 – $170,000
Heart transplant $130,000 – $160,000

(Source: See Appendix 8)

According to a Phoenix Weekly report in 2006, as more and more overseas patients came to China for organ transplants, the fees gradually increased as well. In 2004, the fee for a liver transplant at the Oriental Organ Transplant Center was USD 32,000 (approximately 250,000 yuan). In 2005, it was over USD 40,000 (approximately 330,000 yuan). Some intermediary agencies charged a brokering fee as high as USD 13,000. In addition, overseas patients had to pay monthly fees to interpreters. Staying in the hospital also cost extra. [28] These extra fees explain the higher numbers listed in the table above.

Expensive fees, along with the cheap supply of organs, made organ transplants tremendously profitable. The Organ Transplant Center of the 309th Hospital of the People’s Liberation Army stated, “The Organ Transplant Center is one of the most profitable departments. Gross income was 16,070,000 yuan for 2003 and 13,570,000 yuan for January through June in 2004. It is expected that the gross income will exceed 30,000,000 yuan in 2005.” [29]

Southern Weekend [Nanfang Zhoumo] reported, “The Oriental Organ Transplant Center’s rapid growth has brought about huge revenue and profits. According to previous media reports, liver transplants alone bring the Center an annual income of 100 million yuan (with the exchange rate at 8.11 yuan per US dollar).” [30] In September 2006, the Center put to use a new building with a price tag of 130 million yuan. The new building has 500 beds with a more than 10,000 overall annual turnover rate. The surgery center in the new building can support the operation of nine liver transplants and eight kidney transplants simultaneously. It is the largest, vertically integrated organ transplant center in Asia.”

Such profit from organ transplants bore a grave consequence. On the one hand, people with financial means are willing to buy organs at a high cost. On the other hand, the huge profit pushes the hospitals to pursue new sources of organs by all means. Given China’s political and legal environment, certain groups of people become especially susceptible targets.

3. China turns into a center for global organ transplant tourism

Given the fees involved, the majority of organ transplant patients in China are made up of:

  1. Overseas patients (global organ transplant tourists)
  2. Rich business owners, celebrities, and Communist government officials in mainland China
  3. A small group of desperate, ordinary patients who exhaust all their financial resources for an organ transplant

According to a Lifeweek magazine report in 2004, most of the domestic patients are those who “have their own businesses or enterprises,” or those who “have positions in the government.” The report also stated that within a few years, thousands of overseas patients had gone to China for organ transplants, turning China into “a center for global organ transplant tourism.” “Besides Korean patients, there are patients from more than 20 countries and regions in Asia such as Japan, Malaysia, Egypt, Pakistan, India, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan who have come to the Tianjin No. 1 Central Hospital (also known as the Oriental Organ Transplant Center) for organ transplants… The ward café looks like an international conference center where patients of different colors and ethnic backgrounds gather to share their medical experiences.” [31] (In July 2007, the Ministry of Public Health in China put a stop on Chinese hospitals performing organ transplant surgeries on foreign patients.)

4. A niche market within China’s limited organ market takes off

Exorbitant fees did not make the organ transplant market inaccessible. On the contrary, there was an unexpected, rapid growth in China’s organ transplant market starting in 2003, with an annual growth of 5,000 to 10,000 or even more cases of organ transplants.

Every year, approximately 150 million people in China need organ transplants due to late-stage organ failures. The scarcity of organs was worse than that in the United States and other countries that have advanced organ transplant procedures. However, starting in 2003, China turned into a center for global organ transplant tourism due to its abundant source of organs. In a 2004 interview withLifeweek magazine, Zheng Hong, deputy director of the Oriental Organ Transplant Center, proudly stated, “The availability of organs in China is in fact much better than that in other countries.” [32]

So what was happening here?

In China’s unregulated, overall limited organ market (small market), there is a niche market with abundant availability of organs for special patients (big market). We have to understand this “big market within the small market” phenomenon before we can fully understand the true situation of China’s organ market.

In its denial of the allegations of live organ harvesting, the Chinese Communist regime claimed that there were more than 100 million patients in China waiting for organs. It used this as an argument that it was not possible to get matching organs within a short period of time. However, this denial was contradicted by claims at various organ transplant hospitals.

5. High quality organs used for overseas recipients

There were many abnormal phenomena in China’s organ market during the 2003-2006 period. Besides the features discussed above, there is another one worth mentioning. The quality of the organs was not compromised as the quantity of organs increased. On the contrary, the quality of the organs supplied between 2003 and 2006 was superb. During the peak of China’s global organ transplant tourism, the majority of China’s organ transplant recipients were overseas patients. Similar to exported products, the organs used for these patients had much higher requirements.

In the Q&A section on its website, CITNAC provided this answer to the question on organ quality: “The live donor kidney transplant provided in China is completely different from the cadaver donor kidney transplant provided by hospitals and dialysis centers in Japan.” “The key to kidney transplants is tissue matching. Before the live donor kidney transplant surgery, we test the functions of the donor kidney as well as the donor’s white blood cells to ensure the safety of the donor kidney. It is safe to say that compared to a cadaver donor kidney transplant in Japan, kidney transplants are much safer and more reliable here.” (See Appendix 9 for reference.) The ‘live donor’ characteristic is the selling point to attract overseas patients.

Some independent overseas investigators have phoned organ transplant hospitals in mainland China, posing as patients or patient family members, to inquire about organ transplant information. The answers given were similar: “Donors are all healthy,” “Donors are around 30 years old,” “Quality is guaranteed to be the best.” [33]

6. Sudden disappearance of the abundant donor resources after 2006

Under normal conditions, the availability of organs is rather steady, which, as we discussed earlier, is the case for Canada and the United States, where there has been no major increase or sudden decrease in the past decade. A drastic increase of organs was seen between 2003 and 2006 in China. But after the allegations of live organ harvesting of Falun Gong practitioners surfaced and attracted international attention in March 2006, there was a sudden drop in organ transplants in 2007 in China.

While denying the allegations of live organ harvesting of Falun Gong practitioners, the Chinese Communist regime accelerated the reorganization of its organ transplant market. It introduced several acts to regulate organ transplants and restricted the number of organ transplant hospitals to be by “permission only.” Out of more than 600 previously existing organ transplant hospitals, only 160 received permission to continue operations.

Is the reduction in the number of organ transplant hospitals the reason for the reduction in organ transplants? It is certainly not. At least, this is not the root cause. The reduction in the number of permitted hospitals should lessen the competition for organs. If there is no major change to the source of organs, there should now be more organs available to those major hospitals. Yet, the number of organ transplants at these major hospitals has decreased drastically. Therefore, the issue lies in the disappearance of donor resources, rather than the number of organ transplant hospitals.

In an interview with Science Times in May 2007, Shi Bingyi, director of the Organ Transplant Center of the People’s Liberation Army and member of the standing committee of the Chinese Medical Association Organ Transplant Society, said, “The number of organ transplants in China reached a historic peak in 2006, in which nearly 20,000 cases of organ transplants were performed. For the first five months in 2007, the number of organ transplants has decreased compared to that of the same period in 2006, largely due to the shortage in organ donors.” [34]

An article published in Nanfang Zhoumo in July 2007 describes the issue further: “Organ transplant surgeons complained about the shortage of organ donors.” “Zhu Zhijun is the deputy director of the Orient Organ Transplant Center. In his office on the second floor of the Center, Zhu appeared to be worried. He told the reporter that since the Chinese New Year, the Center, which is the biggest organ transplant facility in Asia, has performed only 15 liver transplants in nearly six months, while in 2006, the Center had set a record of more than 600 liver transplants in one year.” [35]

Relatively Stable Supply of Death Row Organs

Earlier we assumed that the number of organs from death row inmates is relatively stable. Prior to 2003 and after 2006, the number was around 6,000. Several factors contributed to this stability:

1) Organ transplant technology and the use of immune depressants matured in the late 1990s. There was no sudden increase in the number of organ transplants as a result of breakthroughs in technology.

2) Matching requirements for organ transplants remain high; technology has not lessened these requirements, making the same organ resource relatively stable.

3) Lack of an organ sharing network in China, which means most of the matches take place between a local hospital and local death row inmates. This and local protectionism have limited the scope of matching.

4) Death row sentencing is in lock-step with political direction. With no recent Strike-Hard campaigns, the number of death row executions is relatively stable.

5) The legitimacy of using death row organs, as well as the moral acceptance among Chinese due to years of indoctrination that organ donation is the least contribution death row inmates could make to society, have allowed the organ transplant hospitals in China to care less about pressures from the international community.

Based on the above reasons, it can be concluded that organs from executed death row inmates are a relatively stable source of organs, and not responsible for the spike in 2003-2006, or for the subsequent sharp decline.

Impact of the Supreme People’s Court’s Ruling on Death Row Organs

On January 1, 2007, the Supreme People’s Court reclaimed the right to review death row sentences from the provincial supreme courts, resulting in the reduction of death row sentences. Was this the cause for the severe shortage of organ donors in 2007? It had an impact but was not the root cause. According to a Xinhua News Agency report on March 10, 2008, after the Supreme People’s Court’s reclamation of reviewing death sentences, 15% of death row sentences were overturned in 2007. [36] This percentage (likely to be overestimated) indicates that the recovery did not have a large impact on organs available from the executed death row inmates. This can be supported by the actual number of organ transplants performed. In the section, “Reference to Historic data” in Chapter I, we quotedChina Daily that 65% of organs came from death row inmates in 2008 and 2009, in which close to 10,000 cases of organ transplants were performed each year. That means that approximately 6,000 organs came from death row inmates, which is close to the level between 2000 and 2002.

Therefore, the sudden decrease in organs in 2007 has to be due to the sudden disappearance of other organ resources (although it is still uncertain whether they have completely disappeared).

In conclusion, the rapid growth between 2003 and 2006 and the ensuing quick disappearance of organ resources in China are unprecedented in history and bear unique features that are not supported by the theory that death row inmates were the main source of organs during the years in question.

Since 2007, due to the shortage of organ donors, live related donors have become a new source of organs. Chinese media have also carried out extensive campaigns on this subject in an effort to raise awareness. According to a People’s Net report, the Oriental Organ Transplant Center in Tianjin performed 84 cases of live donor liver transplants in 2007 (with a relative donating a partial liver). [37] However, since live donors did not become a major organ resource until after 2006, this does not help explain the period between 2003 and 2006, when China’s organ market skyrocketed.

[27] U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “The Matching Process — Waiting List,” website maintained by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), Healthcare Systems Bureau (HSB), Division of Transplantation, an agency of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,http://www.organdonor.gov/transplantation/matching_process.htm

[28] Chen Yanhui, “Investigation on Global Organ Transplants – Thousands of Foreigners Rushing to China for Organ Transplants, Mainland China Becoming New Center for Global Organ Transplants,”Phoenix Weekly, 2006, No, 5,http://news.phoenixtv.com/phoenixtv/83932384042418176/20060222/751049.shtml

[29] Organ Transplant Center of the 309th Hospital of the PLA, “Brief Introduction of the Organ Transplant Center of the 309th Hospital of People’s Liberation Army,” the Center has deleted certain contents in its introduction, but Chinaaffairs.org has saved all related information,http://www.chinaaffairs.org/gb/detail.asp?id=61744 or http://www.aibang.com/detail/828118414-695423180

[30] Southern Weekend [Nanfang Zhoumo], China stops organ transplant tourism, July 18, 2007,http://www.infzm.com/content/9556

[31] Wang Hongliang, “Investigation in Tianjin: No. 1 Organ Transplant [Facility] in Asia,” LifeweekMagazine, September 22, 2004, http://www.lifeweek.com.cn/2004-09-23/000019783.shtml

[32] Wang Hongliang, “Investigation in Tianjin: No. 1 Organ Transplant [Facility] in Asia,” LifeweekMagazine, September 22, 2004, http://www.lifeweek.com.cn/2004-09-23/000019783.shtml

[33] World Organization to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong (WOIPFG), “Telephone Messages: Evidences of Harvesting Organs from Live Falun Gong Practitioners in China,”http://www.zhuichaguoji.org/en/index2.php?option=content&task=view&id=168&pop=1&page=0

[34] Science Times, “Shortage of Organ Donors is the Bottleneck in Developing Organ Transplants,”http://www.sciencenet.cn/html/showsbnews1.aspx?id=182075

[35] Southern Weekend [Nanfang Zhoumo], China stops organ transplant tourism, July 18, 2007,http://www.infzm.com/content/9556

[36] Xinhua News Agency, “China’s Death Row Sentences with Immediate Execution Dramatically Reduced,” March 10, 2008. http://news.xinhuanet.com/misc/2008-03/10/content_7761537.htm

[37] The People’s Daily website, “Tianjin Orient Organ Transplant Center Performed 84 Cases of Live Donor Liver Transplants in 2007,” Windows on Tianjin section, http://www.022net.com/2007/12-25/425567353391331.html

 

Falun Gong Practitioners Systematically Murdered for Their Organs: Refuting the Chinese Regime’s “Death Row” Explanation, Chapter V

By Ouyang Fei, Sun Sixian, and Lin Zhanxiang

(Clearwisdom.net) In 2006, The Epoch Times newspaper broke a stunning story about what is undoubtedly one of the most horrible atrocities to be committed by any government, not only in modern times, but in all of recorded history. As documented in the investigative report, “Bloody Harvest,” by noted human rights lawyer David Matas and former Canadian Secretary of State for the Asia-Pacific region David Kilgour, there is overwhelming evidence of the Chinese Communist regime’s chilling role in systematically murdering Falun Gong practitioners, harvesting their organs while they are alive, and making huge profits from doing so. In response to the international outcry, the Chinese regime has attempted to explain away one of the main pieces of circumstantial evidence–the meteoric rise in the number of organ transplantations in recent years and the extremely short wait times in a culture notoriously averse to organ donation–by stating that it has harvested organs from executed criminals after their deaths. Faced with undeniable evidence, it has attempted to escape culpability for a monstrous atrocity by admitting to a lesser crime. In this report, we will show evidence that directly contradicts this claim and lends further credence to the serious charges leveled against the Chinese regime.

V. China’s organ transplant market skyrocketed in 2003

According to Huang Jiefu, deputy Minister of Public Health, “The number of organ transplants in China has grown rapidly in the past ten years between 1997 and 2007.” [24] In a story published by Nanfang Zhoumo, “China stops organ transplant tourism,” Huang criticized the explosive growth of organ transplants in hospitals: “There are more than 600 hospitals and over 1,700 doctors engaged in organ transplant surgeries. This is way too many!” [25] By comparison, there are approximately 100 hospitals in the United States specialized in liver transplant surgery and less than 200 specialized in kidney transplant surgery. In Hong Kong, there are only three hospitals, and each is specialized in liver, kidney, and heart transplant surgery respectively. The statistics published by the Tianjin Oriental Organ Transplant Center and the No. 2 Hospital of the Second Military Medical University (also known as Shanghai Changzheng Hospital), two hospitals that have close ties to the Chinese military, provide a glimpse into the rapid growth of China’s organ transplant market. (Appendix 2)

Chinese experts’ figures on organ transplants, although they vary, clearly indicate the massive growth in China’s organ market in the past ten years. (Refer to Appendix 3 for exact data.) Between 2003 and 2006, underground hospitals emerged as well (Appendix 4). The organ transplants from these underground hospitals are very likely not included in the public statistics. Therefore, the number of actual organ transplants during this period should be higher than the public data.

Using the data provided by Huang Jiefu, and Shi Bingyi, director of the Organ Transplant Center of the People’s Liberation Army, as well as reports by the Chinese media, we have created the following table to show the trend in China’s organ transplant market. (See Appendices 3 and 5 for detailed background information.) In it, we have divided the period from 2000 to 2008 into three phases: prior to 2003, between 2003 and 2006, and after 2006.

2000 – 2008: Three phases in China’s Organ Transplant Market

Timeframe Annual No. of Organ Transplants Main source of donors
Phase I Prior to 2003 Averaged around 6,000 since 2000 (with even lower numbers prior to 2000) Death row inmates
Phase II Between 2003 and 2006 12,000 in 2004; other estimates placed the 2005 number at 15,000, and 2006 numbers at 20,000; no conclusive national data available for 2003, however, in a leading military organ transplant hospital, there was an increase of nearly 60% from 2002 to 2003 (with 801 cases), which then almost doubled to 1,601 cases in 2004 (claimed by the hospital website to be the highest number of organ transplant operations in the world in 2004) Death row inmates and other unknown sources
Phase III 2007 and later Dropped approximately 40% by 2008 (no conclusive national data available for 2007) Death row inmates and living donors among relatives

Although the number has dropped significantly since 2007, it is still higher than the period prior to 2003. According to the Chinese government, the higher number is due to the increase of living donors among relatives as a result of vigorous promotions. At present, 40% of organs come from living donors among relatives. [26]

But this doesn’t address the sudden, large increase in transplants from 2003 to 2006.

The question is, who was the source of organs that caused China’s organ transplant market to skyrocket?

The number of organ transplants during the ten-year period between 1997 and 2007 was relatively stable in other countries around the world. In Canada, the number of organ transplants rose from 1,500 in 1997 to 2,200 in 2007, while in the United States the number rose from 20,000 in 1998 to 27,000 in 2008 (Appendix 6). Yet in China, after a relatively stable period between 1997 and 2002, there was a sudden, rapid growth of transplants. After the allegations of live organ harvesting of Falun Gong practitioners emerged in 2006, the number of transplants dropped drastically. China does not fit the worldwide pattern.

[24] Huang Jiefu, Mao Yilei, and J. Michael Millis. “Policy of organ transplant in China,” The Lancet,http://download.thelancet.com/flatcontentassets/series/china/comment11.pdf

[25] Southern Weekend [Nanfang Zhoumo], “China stops the organ transplant tourism,”http://www.infzm.com/content/9556

[26] China Daily, “Public Call for Organ Donations,” August 26, 2009,

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-08/26/content_8616938.htm

Falun Gong Practitioners Systematically Murdered for Their Organs: Refuting the Chinese Regime’s “Death Row” Explanation, Chapter IV

Estimating the upper limit on suitable organs that can be derived from death row “donors”

by Ouyang Fei, Sun Sixian, Lin Zhanxiang

(Clearwisdom.net) In 2006, The Epoch Times newspaper broke a stunning story about what is undoubtedly one of the most horrible atrocities to be committed by any government, not only in modern times, but in all of recorded history. As documented in the investigative report, “Bloody Harvest,” by noted human rights lawyer David Matas and former Canadian Secretary of State for the Asia-Pacific region David Kilgour, there is overwhelming evidence of the Chinese Communist regime’s chilling role in systematically murdering Falun Gong practitioners, harvesting their organs while they are alive, and making huge profits from doing so. In response to the international outcry, the Chinese regime has attempted to explain away one of the main pieces of circumstantial evidence–the meteoric rise in the number of organ transplantations in recent years and the extremely short wait times in a culture notoriously averse to organ donation–by stating that it has harvested organs from executed criminals after their deaths. Faced with undeniable evidence, it has attempted to escape culpability for a monstrous atrocity by admitting to a lesser crime. In this report, we will show evidence that directly contradicts this claim and lends further credence to the serious charges leveled against the Chinese regime.

In this section, we will explain why we are assuming that the number of death row inmates with organs suitable for transplantation is 30% the total.

1. Tissue matching – a bottleneck with death row “donors”

In Chapter II and Appendix 1, we have shown that HLA matching is extremely complex. There are seven groups of HLA, with a total of 148 antigens. The possible permutations number well over 2,000,000. Except for twins from the same egg, it is practically impossible to locate a supplier and a recipient with identical HLA. As a result, rejection reaction always follows a homograft. It has to be treated with intense immune suppression. The probability of unrelated people meeting minimum matching HLA requirements (for immunosuppressant drugs to be effective after transplantation) is between 20-30%. Thus, the percentage of death row inmates with matching organs cannot exceed 30% with any significant sample size.

2. Critical time window dictated by cold ischemia

When an organ leaves the human body, the tissue will break down. When a person’s heart stops beating, his or her organs will be useful for a 15-minute window, and must be procured promptly and preserved by a special medium at very low temperatures. Even under optimal conditions, the organ must be transplanted within a critical time window because of cold ischemia (cooling of an organ with a cold perfusion solution after organ procurement surgery). With current technology, the critical time window is 24 hours for a kidney, 15 hours for a liver, and 6 hours for a heart. Therefore, in addition to tissue matching, cold ischemia is a second critical restraint. It is simply not yet possible to preserve organs suitably for future needs.

In addition to these technical limitations, there are other important considerations when using organs from death row inmates that will be explained below.

3. Death row inmates’ organs, a one-time resource

Organs from death row inmates are a one-time resource. Unlike organs hosted by a pool of living people, organs from death row inmates cannot be reserved for future use. Of course, there are reports that some courts have stayed executions until the hospital found a matching recipient. However, in most cases, executions of death row inmates are a political act for the Chinese Communist regime to maintain its power, and therefore, not every execution can be put on hold for medical reasons. For example, due to perceived political needs, the Chinese Communist regime makes a habit of executing death row inmates on national holidays, such as New Year’s Day, May Day, or National Day, to get the most exposure from the event. Quite often, the dictated times of such executions mean that the inmates’ organs are not used. Wang Guoqi, formerly a burn specialist at the Paramilitary Tianjin General Hospital in Tianjin, testified before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights of the United States House of Representatives. In a written statement he stated, “I have removed skin from the corpses of executed prisoners,” and further described how he went to the places of execution to remove the organs. Among four inmates executed, only one was a match for organs. Dr. Wang was told to take the corpse to an ambulance within 15 seconds of the gunshot. He and another doctor then took 13 seconds to remove the skin. [21]

4. Factors limiting death row inmate organs

Execution of death row inmates happens in different locations and at various times. Since China does not have an organ sharing network, such as the United Network for Organ Sharing in the United States, the tissue matching of organs from the executed inmates can only take place in or near the area of execution. Therefore, death row inmates are considered a rare resource. Some scholars have pointed out that local courthouses often team up with the local hospitals to protect local interests. This phenomenon makes it much harder for hospitals outside the area to get access to organs. It was not until August 2009 that China announced an experimental organ donation system in ten selected provinces and cities.

The following chart illustrates how death row inmates can be divided into four different groups based on their location and times of execution. In principle, in any given location at any given time, the organs from the executed death row inmates can only be matched with the patients in that specific location at that specific time. Thus, the number of wasted organs is likely to be very high.

For this reason, we fear that detained Falun Gong practitioners have become a reservoir for large scale matching and live organ harvesting, which we will discuss in later sections.

5. Harvesting of death row inmate organs follows the “court-driven model”

On October 9, 1984, China’s Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Public Health, and Ministry of Civil Affairs promulgated and implemented the “Interim Provisions on Using Cadavers or Organs from the Cadavers of Death Row Inmates,” providing legal authority for using organs from executed death row inmates.

While the court, the procuratorate, the detention center, and the hospital are integral parts of the process to harvest the death row inmates’ organs, the key party is the court, since it hands down the death sentences and carries out the executions. Prior to execution, the death row inmate is required to undergo blood tests with approval from the detention center. Then the court carries out the execution under the procuratorate’s supervision. Both the court and the procuratorate restrict access to the execution site and assist the doctors in harvesting organs from the executed inmates. The Chinese Communist government adopted this process when China’s organ transplant market was in its earliest stage and introduced the aforementioned 1984 Interim Provisions to give the process legal authority. It has been following this process since. Phoenix Weekly (number 21, 2005) quoted a source as saying, “Without the Justice Department’s approval, it would be impossible for hospitals to harvest organs from executed death row inmates.” [22]

The courts play a key role in procuring organs from executed death row inmates

The court-driven model renders the process of using organs from executed death row inmates a rather public, programmed, and sometimes even bureaucratic one, in which the court, the procuratorate, the detention center, and the hospital play integral roles with their own interests in mind. This process is known to human rights watchers, despite the Chinese Communist government’s consistent denials until recent years (see Preface). It should be made clear that doctors cannot simply go to the detention center and ask the prison guards for executed death row inmates to harvest the organs. The more parties and steps involved, the less efficient the process of organ harvesting.

6. Legal requirements for an “unclaimed bodies” classification

The 1984 Interim Provisions provided the following guidelines for accepting organs from unclaimed cadavers or those from executed inmates; the guidelines stipulate that cadavers are acceptable if:

  1. They are unclaimed or refused by the family of the executed;
  2. They are voluntarily donated by the death row inmates;
  3. Family of the executed gives consent.

Inevitably, driven by potentially huge financial benefits, some people have found ways to exploit loopholes in these guidelines. For example, in some cases, families were not notified of the time of execution and the bodies remained unclaimed as a consequence. Nevertheless, these guidelines do impose legal restrictions on the use of death row inmate’s organs.

Reactions from families of the executed to the embezzlement of death row inmate organs

Since 2000, families of executed inmates have openly complained about the removal of organs without consent. Some have even filed lawsuits. This has increased the uncertainty surrounding the use of death row inmates’ organs.

In September 2000, Yu Yonggang from Taiyuan City, Shanxi Province was sentenced to death for robbery and murder. Yu’s mother repeatedly stated that the hospital and the court had taken away her son’s organs without her consent. She wrote a letter entitled “A Citizen’s Tearful Complaint” to bring the matter out into the open, pointing fingers at the relevant government bodies.

In May 2000, Fu Xingrong, a farmer from Jiangxi Province, was executed for murder. The local court sold his kidneys to one of the major hospitals in Jiangxi Province without Fu’s family’s consent. Out of grief and indignation, Fu’s father committed suicide. Fu’s sister hired an attorney and filed a lawsuit against the local court.

On September 23, 2003, Lanzhou Morning News reported a case in which a detention center in Gansu Province had “donated” organs from an executed death row inmate without his consent. The local court later ruled that the detention center must pay the family 2,000 yuan as compensation. The director of the detention center admitted to the media that organ donation must have written consent from the death row inmate, and that the detention center did not have any written document from the inmate in this case. [23]

The reactions of families such as these have created hesitation about the use of death row prisoners’ organs, at least to a certain degree, and at this time, death-row-derived organs can no longer be considered a broad and readily-available resource.

Other considerations include age (ideally, the ‘donor’ should be between 20 and 30) and health status. Many inmates are addicted to cigarettes, alcohol, and drugs, which makes them less than ideal donors.

All of this explains the relatively low percentage of potentially useful organs that can be derived from death row “donors.” We have discussed how a poorly matched organ directly impacts the quality of the transplant surgery. If a high number of patients were to die on the operating table or have a short survival time after the surgery, it directly impacts the surgeon’s reputation and career. It stands to reason, then, that the transplant surgeon prefers not to use a randomly sourced organ in surgery. In summary, we consider a figure of 20-30% suitable organs derived from death row inmates a reasonable, if not optimistic, estimate, and in our calculations, we have settled on the 30% figure as the upper limit.

Due to these limitations on the use of death row prisoners’ organs, the annual number of organs from executed inmates is probably around 6,000. Yet, between 2003 and 2006, there was a massive growth in China’s organ transplant market. Clearly death row prisoners’ organs alone did not meet this skyrocketing demand.

References

[21] Wang Guoqi, “I have removed skins from the corpses of executed prisoners – testimony by Wang Guoqi, a surgeon at the Tianjin Armed Police Corps Hospital,” cited from The World Journal at http://www.chinamonitor.org/news/qiguang/wqgzb.htm

[22] Phoenix Weekly (number 21, 2005), “Investigation of Organ Donation from Death Row Inmates,” http://www.ifeng.com/phoenixtv/72951501286277120/20050823/617113.shtml

[23] Deng Fei, “Investigation of Organ Donation from Death Row Inmates,” Phoenix Weekly, http://health.sohu.com/20081120/n260760080.shtml

 

Forced Labour and Organ Harvesting

By David Matas
May 31, 2009


Chinese doctor Wang Wenyi speaks at a press conference in Arlington, Virginia, 26 April 2006 about forced organ harvesting by Chinese authorities on live Falun Gong practitioners. (Nicholas Kamm/AFP/Getty Images)

China engages systematically in forced labour in all forms of detention facilities – prisons which house sentenced criminals, administrative detention for those not yet charged, and re-education through labour camps. A 1998 declaration of the International Labour Organization (ILO) commits all member states, including China, to eliminate forced labour. The Government of China reported to the ILO that its constitution prohibits forced labour and that there is a national policy of eliminating all forms of forced labour.

China is not a country with an independent judiciary and the rule of law. There is no means in China of enforcing the promises in the Constitution. What the Constitution of China says is not a reliable indicator of what is happening in China.

The Constitution of China provides:

“Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration”[1].

“Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief.

“No state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion”[2].

Yet, these freedoms do not exist in China.

So, when the Government of China says that there is a constitutional provision, its statements may be and often are smokescreens, exercises in hypocrisy. That is true of its statements to the ILO on forced labour.

The same can be said about policy. China has many policies which diverge from reality. Indeed, the Government of China refers so often to the state constitution and Government policies when the reality is the opposite that the very Government reference to these standards should be an indicator that something improper is happening in China.

Organ harvesting

A policy area with which I am familiar is organ harvesting, the killing of prisoners for their organs to be used for transplants. David Kilgour and I have written a report that some of those prisoners are Falun Gong practitioners detained for their innocent beliefs[3].

The Government of China denies the conclusion of our report and says that those who are in prison merely because they are Falun Gong practitioners are not killed for their organs. Yet the Government does not deny that some prisoners are killed for their organs and that these prisoners are the primary source of organs for transplants in China.

Deputy Health Minister Huang Jiefu, speaking at a conference of surgeons in the southern city of Guangzhou in mid November 2006, acknowledged that executed prisoners sentenced to death are a source of organ transplants. He said: “Apart from a small portion of traffic victims, most of the organs from cadavers are from executed prisoners.”

The dispute David Kilgour and I have with the Government of China is which sort of prisoners are killed for their organs. The Government of China says that the prisoners killed for their organs are all prisoners sentenced to death. Why we disagree with the Government of China, why we conclude that prisoners sentenced to death are not the only prison source of organs for transplants in China, I put to one side for now. I invite you to read our report Bloody Harvest to see how we came to our conclusions.

The point I want to make here is that the Government of China, at the same time as it admits sourcing organs from prisoners, has a policy of not sourcing organs from prisoners. In a news release dated October 5, 2007, the World Medical Association announced at the annual General Assembly in Copenhagen that the Chinese Medical Association agreed that organs of prisoners and other individuals in custody must not be used for transplantation except for members of their immediate family.

Liu Zhi of the Chinese Medical Association’s international department said that the agreement with the World Medical Association has no legal effect. He nonetheless expressed the hope that the agreement would influence China’s 500,000 doctors and government decisions, a hollow wish as long as China does not have an organ donor system or a law sourcing organs from the brain dead/cardiac alive.

Forced labour

Chinese government hypocrisy on forced labour could not be more blatant. Forced labour in detention is not an abuse of Chinese law. It is the law. The Chinese Law on Prisons stipulates that prisons may punish a prisoner who is able bodied but refuses to work[4].

The United States signed a memorandum of understanding with China in 1992 committing the Government of China to ensure that prison labour products are not exported to the United States. The US in 1994 signed a statement of cooperation which in principle allowed US officials to gain access to Chinese production facilities suspected of exporting prison labour products. The US China Economic and Security Review Commission in its report to Congress for 2008 wrote that “the Chinese government has not complied with its commitments” under the 1992 and 1994 agreement “making it impossible for U.S. officials to conduct complete and useful investigations of such allegations”.

Speaking to U.S. journalists in November 1993, in answer to a question about the desire by rights groups to inspect prisons, then Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said, “I believe that if the Red Cross does put forward such a request…, we would give positive consideration to that request.” The Red Cross did put forward such a request, and there was no positive consideration.

Persons are routinely detained in China without charge or for long periods before a charge is laid. Forced labour occurs in administrative detention and the euphemestically labelled re-education camps as well in prisons where sentenced criminals are kept.

Once the practice of Falun Gong was banned in 1999, hundreds of thousands of Falun Gong practitioners travelled to Beijing to protest or to unfold banners calling for the group’s legalization.People came almost daily.Author Jennifer Zeng, formerly of Beijing and now living in Australia, writes that by the end of April 2001 there had been approximately 830,000 arrests in Beijing of Falun Gong adherents who had been identified.

Those who revealed their identities to their captors were shipped back to their home localities. Their families were implicated in their Falun Gong activities and pressured to join in the effort to get the practitioners to renounce Falun Gong. Their workplace leaders, their co-workers, their local government leaders were held responsible and penalized for the fact that these individuals had gone to Beijing to appeal or protest.

To protect their families and avoid the hostility of the people in their locality, many detained Falun Gong declined to identify themselves. The result was a large Falun Gong prison population whose identities the authorities did not know. As well, no one who knew them knew where they were.

There are no statistics available of practitioners who were arrested but refused to self identify. From our interviews with released Falun Gong practitioners, we know that the number of those who did not self identify is large. But we do not know how large.

Arrested Falun Gong practitioners were initially sent to administrative detention centres. Those who recanted were released. Those who did not recant were tortured. Those who recanted after torture were released. Those who did not recant after torture disappeared into the re-education through labour camps. The U.S. State Department’s 2005 country report on China[5] indicates that its police run hundreds of detention centres, with the ‘re-education through labour’ ones alone having a holding capacity of about 300,000 persons.

The Department of State’s Country Reports for 2008 state: “Some foreign observers estimated that Falun Gong adherents constituted at least half of the 250,000 officially recorded inmates in the country’s “reeducation through labour camps….”[6]

Forced organ donor banks

An extremely large group of people subject to the exercise of the whims and power of the state, without recourse to any form of protection of their rights, provides a potential source for organ harvesting of the unwilling. These detention facilities are not just forced labour camps. They are also potential forced organ donor banks.

The investigations which led to the report David Kilgour and I wrote had many chilling moments. One of the most disturbing was the discovery of a massive prison/detention/labour camp population of the unidentified. Practitioner after practitioner who eventually was released from detention told us about this population. A collection of some of their statements is set out in our report.

What these practitioners told us was that they personally met the unidentified in detention in significant numbers. We have met many Falun Gong practitioners who were released from Chinese detention. Yet, except for those detained during the early days of Falun Gong repression, we have yet to meet or hear of, despite their large numbers, a practitioner released from detention who refused to self identify in detention from the beginning to the end of the detention period. What happened to these many practitioners? Where are they?

I went to Geneva in November 2008 to meet with the United Nations Committee against Torture about the report of Government of China on compliance the Convention against Torture. The Committee, in its November 2008 concluding observations, wrote: “While noting the State party’s information about the 2006 Temporary Regulation on Human Organ Transplants and the 2007 Human Organ Transplant Ordinance, the Committee takes cognizance of the allegations presented to the Special Rapporteur on Torture who has noted that an increase in organ transplant operations coincides with ‘the beginning of the persecution of [Falun Gong practitioners]’ and who asked for ‘a full explanation of the source of organ transplants’ which could clarify the discrepancy and disprove the allegation of organ harvesting (A/HRC/7/3/Add.1). The Committee is further concerned with information received that Falun Gong practitioners have been extensively subjected to torture and ill-treatment in prisons and that some of them have been used for organ transplants (arts. 12 and 16).

“The State party should immediately conduct or commission an independent investigation of the claims that some Falun Gong practitioners have been subjected to torture and used for organ transplants and take measures, as appropriate, to ensure that those responsible for such abuses are prosecuted and punished[7].”

We are independent from the Government of China and the Falun Gong community. The Committee against Torture did not mean to suggest anything different. What they were proposing was an investigation independent from the Government of China with which the Government of China would nonetheless cooperate by giving access to Chinese territory, documents, places of detention, and witnesses in China without fear of intimidation or reprisals.

The reaction of the Government of China to these concluding observations was this: “Some biased committee members, in drafting the observations, chose to ignore the substantial materials provided by the Chinese Government, quoted and even fabricated some unverified information. Running counter to the ethics of justice and objectiveness, they attempted to politicize the review by squeezing some unreal and stigmatized comments into the concluding observations, which China firmly opposes[8].”

The Chinese Government reaction, by referring to “some biased committee members” suggests that some members of the Committee were biased and others were not. Yet, the Committee recommendations were unanimous. Either all the Committee members were biased or none were.

The Government of China as well makes wild general accusations. It accuses the Committee of fabricating information without indicating what that information is which was supposedly fabricated. Nor does it indicate what are the comments in the Committee’s concluding observations the Government considers unreal and stigmatized.

Despite the vagueness of the reaction, it is apparent that the Government of China did not accept the concluding observations of the Committee in their entirety. When it came to the Universal Periodic Review, a procedure of the UN Human Rights Council in which the human rights record of every UN member state is reviewed periodically, the Government of China was a lot more specific.

I went to Geneva again, in January, this year and lobbied governments to raise the violations identified in our organ harvesting report when China’s turn came up at UN Universal Periodic Review Working Group. At the very least, I asked states to request China’s compliance with foundational rights, the respect for which would have made the violations we identified impossible. Many delegates did speak out for these foundational rights during the two hours of the Universal Periodic Review Working Group allocated to these speeches, but to no avail. The Government of China rejected virtually all these rights.

China rejects

The Universal Periodic Review Working Group came out with a report tabulating the recommendations of states which spoke during debate. The Government of China reaction, which followed immediately upon release of the report, gave us a clear idea of what its earlier words had meant. It accepted some recommendations, mostly from other gross violator states which commended the Government of China for its efforts and encouraged it to keep on doing what it was doing. It added that it would consider other recommendations. There was also a long list of recommendations the Government of China rejected out of hand.

At the Universal Periodic Review Working Group, Canada recommended that China implement the recommendations of the Committee against Torture. The Government of China explicitly, in writing, rejected this recommendation.

Canada, the United Kingdom, Hungary, the Czech Republic, France, Sweden and New Zealand recommended that China abolish all forms of arbitrary detention, including re-education through labour camps. The Government of China said no to this recommendation.

Forced labour is an abuse of the rights of those in detention in China. It also harms workers around the world by undercutting the prices of products free workers produce for wages, contributing to global unemployment in a time of economic downturn. And it sets the stage for organ harvesting of Falun Gong practitioners.

Allowing outsider access to Chinese places in detention is not an end in itself. It is rather a means to an end, to assess compliance with international standards, to ensure that abuses in detention are not occurring.

Something similar can be said of forced labour. Ending forced labour is an end of itself. But it is also a means to an end. Ending forced labour and allowing independent investigators to visit places of detention would be important steps towards ending abusive organ sourcing from Falun Gong practitioners.

Canada should have legislation banning the importation of goods produced through forced labour. The Government of Canada should negotiate an agreement with the Government of China committing the Government of China to ensure that prison labour products are not exported to Canada. The agreement should allow Canadian officials to gain access to Chinese production facilities suspected of exporting forced labour products.

The fact that China has not respected similar agreements with the United States is no reason to abandon the effort to stop the export of forced labour products from China. Where the efforts of one country, the US, have failed, the efforts of many countries may succeed. In any case, at the end of the day, when it comes to promoting respect for human rights, we can never rest content with no as an answer.

[1] Article 35

[2] Article 36

[3] Bloody Harvest: Report into Allegations of Organ Harvesting of Falun Gong Practitioners in China

[4] Article 58

[5] U.S. Department of State 2005 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – China, March 8, 2006.

[6] 2008 Report on International Religious Freedom: China

[7] Concluding observations of the UN Committee against Torture on China UN Document number CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 21 November 2008 paragraph 18(C).

[8] Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Remarks on Concluding Observations of United Nations Committee against Torture on China’s Compliance with the Convention against Torture

This article comprises remarks made by David Matas at a Forum on Human Right in China held in Canada’s Parliament buildings on May 27, 2009.

David Matas is a Winnipeg based international human rights lawyer and the co-author, with David Kilgour, of “Bloody Harvest: Revised Report into Allegations of Organ Harvesting of Falun Gong Practitioners in China

Last Updated
May 31, 2009

An Investigation Report on the CCP’s Foreign Propaganda System Making Ideology Infiltration and Spreading Hatred and Lies Among the International Communities

(July 29, 2008 updated)
Introduction …………………………………………………………………..2
Background …………………………………………………………………..2
1. The CCP’s Global Foreign Propaganda Strategy ……………………………………………………3
1.1 Spreading the CCP’s Propaganda Abroad and the International Strategy ………………………….4
1.2 The Officials Who Are in Charge of Foreign Propaganda Tried to Avoid the Word “Propaganda” ……5
1.3 The Key United Front Objects That Foreign Propaganda Organizations Should Targe ……………..6
1.4 Policies on How to Influence Foreign Media through Business Operations ………………………….7
1.5 Implementing Spokesperson System to Unify Statement …………………………………………10
1) Confusing Concepts and Equating the CCP with China ………………………………………11

2) Information Blockade ……………………………………………………………………11

3) Chinese Communist Regime Instigates People’s Hatred towards Falun Gong and Implements Genocide Policy against Falun Gong …………………………………………………………………….12

4) Creating a False Façade to Avoid International Criticism ………………………………13

2. The Expansion of the CCP’s Totalitarian and Dictatorial Ideology to the World ……………………….13

2.1 The CCP’s Main Overseas Propaganda Media and Their Global Coverage …………………………14

Xinhua News Agency’s Goal: “Bring the Earth under Its Control” ………………………………..14

China News Service Is the Main Source of Information for Media in Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and

Overseas Chinese-Language Media ………………………………………………………………14

China Radio International’s (CRI) Programs Cover the World ……………………………………15

CCTV-9 Broadcast Reaches 98% of the Earth’s Surface ………………………………………..15

CCTV-4 Programs Basically Reach the Entire World …………………………………………..15

People’s Daily’s Overseas Edition Is Circulated in Over 80 Countries and Regions …………………16

China Daily Is Circulated in Over 150 Different Countries and Regions ………………………….16

20% of the Hits on the CCP Central Committee’s Mouthpieces Came from Outside of China …16

2.2 Reinforce Overseas Propaganda via Western Media ……………………………………………..16

3. Establishing the Global Ideology United Front with a Variety of Styles and Means ……………………19

3.1 Infiltration through Radio, Film, Video, Books, Magazines and Comprehensive Cultural Exchange

Activities ……………………………………………………………………………………………19

Broadcasting ……………………………………………………………………………..19

Propaganda toward Foreign Countries via Film and Video ……………………………………… 20

Foreign Propaganda through Publications ……………………………………………………….21

Cultural Exchange ……………………………………………………………………………….22

3.2 To Defeat the Criticism on Human Rights by “International Anti-China Forces”, the CCP Raises the

Banner of Upholding Human Rights ……………………………………………………………….23

3.3 Developing the Internet, Opening up New Channels for Overseas Infiltration ……………………..25

Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………………………….27

Introduction

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has considered the theory of Karl Marx, a native of Germany, as “the fundamental guiding ideology for founding the country and the party”. [1] After the CCP seized the power by armed force and violence in 1949, under the banner of “progressing” from “private ownership” to “public ownership”, [2] it blatantly extorted privately owned money and wealth and quickly brought the entire national resource under its control. In addition, the CCP decided to make the so-called “progression” from “private ownership” to “public ownership” its fundamental task during its transitional period [3] and had this decision written in the first constitution [4] drafted by the CCP. Later on, it put Marxism-Leninism and the CCP’s dictators’ wills into the second Chinese Constitution as the “guidance” for the Chinese people of all nationalities, [5] and then instilled it to all Chinese people and forced them to betray the great heritage of Chinese traditional culture and the traditional morality. During the CCP’s despotic rule of over fifty years, 80,000,000 Chinese people have died of unnatural causes. [6] To counteract the international communities’ reactions, the Foreign Propaganda Office of the CCP Central Committee (which is called the Information Office of the State Council to the public) was established as the CCP’s highest government body for coordinating its overseas propaganda. Its task is to make media outlets responsible for overseas propaganda follow the CCP’s will in their campaign of “introducing China to the world”, disseminate the CCP’s ideology abroad, influence the public opinions and diplomatic polices of the Western countries, and lead the world media to cater to the CCP’s needs.

Background

In the early times, the CCP’s main foreign propaganda channel was its mouthpiece, Xinhua News Agency. In December 1955, Mao Zedong, then the head of the CCP, ordered Xinhua News Agency to “bring the Earth under its control” and “to send its reporters to the different regions in the world as soon as possible and to disseminate its own news”. [7] By that time, the CCP had already shown its ambition of unifying the world with its ideology. Based on this goal, the overseas propaganda organs, each of which had “done things in its own way”, were brought under the unified leadership of the Foreign Affairs Group of the CCP Central Committee in August 1958, and the group leader was Chen Yi, then the Vice Premier of the State Council and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. [8] On June 4, 1989, the CCP crushed the students’ democratic movement through military force, which resulted in the world-shocking “June 4” Massacre. The CCP was strongly condemned for the massacre by the international communities, including the overseas Chinese people. [9] In July of the same year, the top leaders of seven countries, including the United States, France, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, Italy, and Canada, as well as the Chairman of the European Community held a meeting in Paris, and declared sanctions against the CCP; the sanction measures included ceasing the top-level political contacts with China, postponing the World Bank loans to China, etc. [10] At that time, the international environment underwent dramatic changes: the destruction of Berlin Wall, the fall, in succession, of the communist governments in East Europe and of the Soviet Union; in addition, the international human rights movement was at its peak. Under this general background, the CCP patriarch leader Deng Xiaoping proposed a foreign policy of “hiding our capacities and biding our time, [11] and waiting for the right time to come to make huge accomplishments”, aiming at cheating the international communities into lower their guards and executing his strategic plan of letting China accumulate forces and then dominate the world later. To foster a “good” image, walk out of the predicament, and step up its propaganda and infiltration to foreign countries, the CCP established, in January 1991, the Information Office of the State Council, as the highest body for coordinating its overseas propaganda works. [12] In March 1993, the Information Office of the State Council and the Foreign Propaganda Group of CCP Central Committee, which shared one work unit under two nameplates, were listed directly under CCP Central Committee and are controlled directly by the Party. [13] In the same year, the Foreign Propaganda Group was renamed as Foreign Propaganda Office. [14] All provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities that are directly under the Central Government have also set up their own corresponding Foreign Propaganda Office (or Information Office). [15]

In March 1998, the CCP reinstated that the Information Office of the State Council and the Foreign Propaganda Office of the CCP Central Committee are still one work unit with two nameplates and are under the direct leadership of the CCP Central Committee [16]. In April of the same year, Zhao Qizheng, then Deputy Mayor of Shanghai, was promoted to the director of Foreign Propaganda Office [17]. But this office is still called the Information Office of the State Council to the public, so as to have an even more strategic ideology infiltration through means of providing information, making foreign contacts, helping the spreading of the media, serving as a liaison, etc. Besides the Secretary Bureau, which is in charge of documents management and administrative affairs, and the Personnel Bureau, which is in charge of personnel management and training for its affiliated branches, there are seven other bureaus established directly under this office, [18] and each of the bureaus has its own function while sharing the same goal — to spread the CCP’s intentions abroad.

On July 20, 1999, the CCP and Jiang Zemin declared their suppression of the populace who believe in “Truthfulness-Compassion-Forbearance”. Jiang said, “How could it be possible that Marxist theory, the materialism and atheism believed by our Communists would not be able to defeat Falun Gong’s teachings?” “If indeed that was the case, wouldn’t it be a big joke?”[19] This time, the CCP learned the lesson of being sanctioned by the international communities after the “June 4” Massacre in 1989, and it also put into use its knowledge of torturing people and the cruel means that it has accumulated over its history of near one hundred years. In the persecution of Falun Gong populace, the CCP has gradually changed from an overt way to a covert way, so the persecution has appeared to be even more deceiving to the public. Over the nine years, the Foreign Propaganda Office of the CCP Central Committee has been actively following and participating in the persecution; it has used many means, such as holding press conferences, having culture exchanges, using internet, radio, and television, publishing books and other materials, etc., to spread the lies to the international societies so as to defame Falun Gong, incite people to hate Falun Gong, justify the crimes that the CCP has committed against Falun Gong practitioners and use various means to make the international communities keep silence in front of the large-scale, genocidal persecution against people’s belief.

This report consists mainly of the investigation findings regarding how the Foreign Propaganda Office of the CCP Central Committee (interchangeable with the Information Office of the State Council) has used various foreign propaganda channels to disseminate its communist despotic ideology and carry out the persecution of human rights.

1. The CCP’s Global Foreign Propaganda Strategy

The CCP’s foreign propaganda can be considered as a gunpowder-free warfare that is carried out in the Post-Cold War era. It attacks on the Western democracy initiated by the remaining communist dictatorship. In cooperation with its Global United Work Front Strategy, the CCP’s goal is to gain supremacy in ideology control over the Western society. For example, Zhao Qizheng, the director of the Foreign Propaganda Office of the CCP Central Committee has considered the CCP’s foreign propaganda as an “undertaking of winning over public opinions” and a “struggle”. Zhao said, “During this struggle, [we] need to make best use of the favorable opportunities, actively launch the campaign, favorably control the warfare, try to take preemptive measures, and try to dominate the overseas media. Our goal is to have the overseas media follow our steps. … We need to actively promote China to the United States and other important Western countries so as to guide the world media; this needs not only a higher mastery of the art, but also a unified overall strategy. It should be even more so that we intentionally allocate our resources to the important regions and countries, make a full play of our strengths, focus on important aspects, make unremitting efforts, so as to make breakthroughs in those important countries, targets, and media, etc.”[20]

1.1 Spreading the CCP’s Propaganda Abroad and the International Strategy

After the “June 4” Massacre in 1989, Jiang Zemin, then the General Secretary of the CCP, said, “Foreign propaganda is a work of winning over public opinions,” and “Doing well in foreign propaganda is a work of strategic significance to our party and nation.” [21]

On February 26, 1999, in the CCP’s National Conference of Foreign Propaganda, Jiang Zemin, who appointed himself to represent the CCP and the State Council, conveyed the greetings to those involved in the work of foreign propaganda, and acknowledged that they have made “good achievements” in helping the CCP foster a “good image” and “improve the external environments of public opinion”. He also pointed out that the foreign propaganda was “a work of strategic significance, and the CCP Central Committee has always considered it very important”, and that it needs to put great effort in promoting the “tremendous achievements” that the CCP had made during the fifty years after it came into power; it should “obey and serve the Party’s overall strategy”, obey and serve the “overall foreign strategy”, and should definitely “focus its effect on enhancing the foreigners’ understanding and supports”. [22]

In the end of October 1999, before his state visit to France, Jiang Zemin was interviewed by the chief editor Alain Peyrefitt of a French newspaper, Le Figaro, for a written report. Jiang took advantage of the opportunity and personally proclaimed Falun Gong as an “evil cult”, [23] and thus set the tone for the CCP’s mouthpieces to defame Falun Gong. This unified statement is still being used up to now.

In March 2000, Guo Jingzhe, the Editor-in-Chief of China Radio International (CRI), when sharing his anti-Falun Gong understandings in the area of foreign propaganda work, said, “Whoever can first let people know the important news in the world, will win over more people, and otherwise, will lose the people. The timing effect of the news is for sure not just a pure technique issue, but also a political one that is concerned with our competing with the Western media for readership and audience. …When reporting China’s exposing and denouncing ‘Falun Gong’ to the foreign countries, we (initially) just copied what had been used in China, and used some specific technical terms, and as a result, we had great difficulties in letting the foreign people understand and accept it. Later, when we clearly pointed out that ‘Falun Gong’ was an evil cult in our foreign propaganda, the foreign people immediately understood and accepted it. This is helpful to win over the international public opinion…” [24]

On January 25, 2000, the National Conference of Foreign Propaganda was held in Beijing. In the conference, the director of Foreign Propaganda Office of the CCP Central Committee and Information Office of the State Council, Zhao Qizheng gave a summary talk. He required attendees to “actively express China’s opinions, according to the changes in the international public opinion. The personnel in the field of foreign propaganda need to do more research, make plans, explore and learn the rules; and improve the efficiency to do better job.” The officials from all over the country, who are in charge of foreign propaganda in their respective regions, the officials and spokesmen from the CCP Central Committee and other offices under the state council, and some officials from Chinese embassies and consulates attended the conference. [25]

From January 13 to 15, 2001, the National Conference of Foreign Propaganda was held in Beijing. In the conference, the director of Foreign Propaganda Office of the CCP Central Committee and Information Office of the State Council, Zhao Qizheng emphasized that “(we should) create a favorable international atmosphere for public opinion, according to Jiang Zemin and the CCP Central Committee’s requirement on foreign propaganda.” [26]

In 2003, the deputy chief editor of Xinhua News Agency, Xia Lin said in an article titled “The Power of the Mouthpiece” that “information is a kind of strategic resource. Whoever has the control of information source and media—international radio, satellite TV and internet, will have the power to influence the whole society, and is able to take over the dominant and preemptive position in the battle of ideology.” [27]

In 2004, in a speech at China Foreign Affairs University, the director of Foreign Propaganda Office of the CCP Central Committee, Zhao Qizheng also mentioned the issue of “taking over the dominant and preemptive position”. He said, “Media reports may not be 100% objective.” “Whoever has the dominant position in reporting, will get the support and understanding from the international community and the public, thus will have the preemptive opportunities.” “The so-called dominant position means to have others believe in your opinion and news. The propaganda as a strategic weapon in the fields of politics, foreign affairs, economy and commerce has been used by every country and played an important role in history.” [28] On May 13, 2004, in a speech at Tsinghua University, Zhao Qizheng said that “global propaganda” is one of the overall tasks in CCP’s strategic view. It is the “soft power” and “an important component of our nation’s composite power.” [29]

On September 2, 2004, in the celebration of 60th anniversary of Xinhua News Agency Launching International English Broadcasting, the head of the Propaganda Department of the CCP Central Committee, Liu Yunshan required Xinhua News Agency to “focus on the task of making itself accepted and referred by the media in the countries and regions who have important influence on international public opinions and play important roles in international community” and “do research on and make plans for each country and area one by one.” He also required Xinhua News Agency to strengthen contacts with mainstream media in foreign countries and try its best to “enlarge the global coverage”; “expand our occupation on the battlefield of international public opinion;” when reporting the hot issues and important events inside and outside China, Xinhua News Agency needs to “be in the leading position, preoccupy people’s view, and take the initiative of influencing and leading the international public opinion.” [30]

1.2 The Officials Who Are in Charge of Foreign Propaganda Tried to Avoid the Word “Propaganda”

In 2004, the research group of “Research on efficient foreign propaganda” of Xinhua News Agency claimed that “The media outlets in charge of foreign propaganda can do many things in the struggle with foreign public opinion regarding the sensitive issues such as human rights, Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, the argument that China is a global threat and the issue of Falun Gong, but we must conduct things according to the rules of information dissemination, and need to pay attention to the art and strategy of propaganda.” [31]

In the same year, Zhao Qizheng talked about how he “introduces China to the world” in a speech at China Foreign Affairs University. He said “when people asked me what task we have in the future, my reply was to ‘introduce China to the world’. I didn’t use the word ‘propaganda,’ because it could well be a derogatory term. What we need to introduce to the world? It’s to explain China’s policy, to counter attack on China. It is as simple as that. We have a variety of (propaganda) methods to choose from.” [32]

In July 2005, the deputy director of the Information Office of the State Council, Qian Xiaoqian [33] was interviewed by reporters from Hong Kong Wenweipo. He mentioned that he doesn’t use the word “propaganda” in the work of Tibetan issue, of which he is in charge. Instead, he uses “Introduce Tibet, Introduce China” to explain Tibetan issues. He thought by using the word “introduce” the propaganda effect is “the most powerful and most convincing.” [34]

Out of the same concern, in Chinese official documents, the English translation for the propaganda department was changed from “Propaganda Department of the CCP Central Committee” to “Department of Publicity”; and for the same reason, “International Communication Office of the CCP Central Committee” became the official translation to replace “Foreign Propaganda Office of the CCP Central Committee”.

1.3 The Key United Front Objects That Foreign Propaganda Organizations Should Target

The research group of “the research on efficient foreign propaganda” of Xinhua News Agency believes “The main targets of foreign propaganda should be the middle and upper class in the target countries, including politicians, people in business circles and intellectuals because they control either the political or the economic power and have the influence on the ideology and public opinion of those countries. Our media outlets responsible for foreign propaganda should focus on the mainstream media in the target countries. Based on our own features and characteristics, we should enhance the communications and collaboration with them. Especially, we should make friends with the famous people in foreign media. We should have intimate relationship with them, and do well the work of foreign propaganda with their help.” [35]

“Moreover, overseas Chinese and Chinese students studying abroad are another group of people deserving attention from overseas propaganda departments… Presently, there are over tens of millions of overseas Chinese and Chinese students studying abroad; many of them have become part of the mainstream society, sometimes even quite influential elites. Foreigners generally learn about China through overseas Chinese. Therefore, overseas Chinese bridge China and the outside world in a unique manner.” [35]

In the speech at China Foreign Affairs University, the director of Foreign Propaganda Office of the CCP Central Committee, Zhao Qizheng claimed, “We also have communication with foreign media. We have very close relationship, not only with the big guys like Ted Turner, but also with Associated Press, Agence France-Presse, Reuters, the biggest publishing house in France, and German company Bertelsmann — the biggest publishing house in the world.” Zhao Qizheng also gave an example to show how he convinced Ted Turner, the founder of CNN to take off the footage of a young man standing in front of a group of tanks and trying to stop them from advancing in the Tiananmen Massacre event, which CNN had been using as news header with other footage. Zhao said, “Turner asked me ‘Is CNN good?’ and I answered ‘no.’ He then asked why. I said ‘in the beginning of your hourly news, there are a lot of footages of important international political events, and in one of them, a Chinese young man stood in front of tanks during the Tiananmen Square event. You have been showing this footage for 10 years.’ He said, ‘not just us. All TV stations broadcast the footage this way.’ I said, ‘it is just you. Other people stopped long time ago.’ He, then, said to the manager of department of international news who was next to him, ‘Why are you still showing this footage? There are similar events in America, too. You will see how I will punish you.’ Then I said ‘sentence him to death penalty with a reprieve and let him correct himself.’ At that time, I thought that Turner was joking, but later I heard that he really punished that manager and also deleted that footage.” [32]

China News Service, which is the national news press in China in charge of the foreign propaganda, organized “World Chinese Media Forum” in Nanjing between September 16 and September 18 in 2001. It is said that 150 high-ranking officials and 130 overseas Chinese media outlets from more than 30 countries and regions attended the conference. There were also over 60 Chinese media outlets inside China attending the conference. The officials, who are in charge of propaganda and “unified front” at each level of CCP, attended the conference and gave speeches. The topics of the forum included “What role overseas Chinese media should play and how they should position themselves?” “How can overseas Chinese media and the media in China enhance the communication between each other?” etc. The attendee discussed intensively and gave suggestions on the propaganda strategy about how to create a favorable international public opinion under the lead of CCP’s ideology. [36]

In 2003, the deputy head of the Unified Front Department of Huizhou City CCP Committee in Guangdong Province, Huang Qiongji said, “We need to take full advantage of being next to Hong Kong and Macao geographically, and enhance the connections with media in Hong Kong and Macao. We need to do better to make friends with the middle and upper class people in those media, and strengthen our effort in reforming them. We should focus on the communication with “four newspapers and two journals” in Hong Kong and Macao. We need to build up the good connections with the mainstream media.” Also, he asked to enhance the “unified front” and propaganda work to the foreign visitors. He said, “More and more foreigners will come to China for business or tour. We need to organize more activities to make friends with foreign investors, experts and foreign students studying in China.” [37]

1.4 Policies on How to Influence Foreign Media through Business Operations

Huang Qiongji, head of Department of Unified Front of the Huizhou City CCP Committee, advocates, “maximize effort to incorporate the unified front and foreign propaganda work into mainstream Western society…incorporate unified front and foreign propaganda work into economic exchanges; at the same time we should strengthen our contact with foreign media, especially the communication with the mainstream media in the US and the industrial groups of seven Western countries, pay attention to keeping up friendly relations with foreign media personnel stationed in China and having a deep friendship with them; sponsor some friendship-promoting activities in an organized manner…and through them create a front for overseas propaganda and expand the sphere of unified front and overseas propaganda work.” [37]

On September 23, 2003, during the 2nd World Chinese Media Forum, Liu Zepeng, head of China News Service gave good publicity of the policy of “borrowing a boat to go overseas,” which was, by having media inside China directly provide a special edition for overseas Chinese newspapers, disseminate China’s propaganda to foreign countries. He claimed that, “Right now, foreign media are vying for a spot in the Mainland China market, and they have enjoyed tremendous success,” and he further enticed that, “overseas Chinese media should take advantage of this situation and seize the opportunity…take advantage of your geographic affinity and seek development and business opportunities for your media while helping the Mainland Chinese media enter the world.” [38]

Wu Yurong [39] a Ph.D. graduate of the “scientific socialism” major from the Party School of the CCP Central Committee proposed in 2002, “overseas media, especially some transnational media corporations are in fact commercial institutions, and their ultimate goal is to make money. That being the case, we can restrict and influence overseas mainstream media through commercial regulations, for example, by adjusting business relationship with western media corporations, limiting or approving these corporations’ business activities in China or buying their stock to influence the decision makers of these corporations.” Wu Yurong also listed some examples of success, “During the mid 1990s, we made News Corp. end its anti-China BBC ‘World TV’ programs by allowing it to develop satellite TV in China; and by restricting “Disney” commercial activities we effectively suppressed Disney’s participation in the production of programs aiming at secession of Tibet.” [40]

In 1993, Rupert Murdoch, board chairman of News Corp. bought 63.6% shares of Hong Kong’s Star TV stock with 525 million USD (he bought the rest of the stock in 1995) [41]. Soon after that, he announced, “Star TV has constituted an unambiguous threat to totalitarian regimes in the world.” Within weeks after he made the speech [42], on October 5, 1993, China’s State Council published “Provisions on the Administration of Ground Receiving Facilities for Satellite Television Transmissions,” which stated, “individuals are not allowed to install or use satellite ground receiving equipments,” “local TV stations, cable TV channels and broadcast stations are all prohibited from transmitting overseas satellite TV programs.” [43]

In order to gain more market share in Mainland China, Murdoch changed his standing and tried to be in the CCP’s good graces. First, he firmly ousted BBC, which angered the CCP for broadcasting documentaries on the human rights condition in China [44]; on March 25, 1996, Star TV, 100% owned by News Corp., founded Phoenix Satellite Television Holdings Ltd. along with two Chinese companies. [45] The two Chinese companies are Today’s Asia Ltd. and Huaying International Corporation Ltd. Today’s Asia Ltd. is under the management of formal high ranking official of the Central People’s Broadcasting Station, Liu Changle [46] (who is currently the chair of Board of Directors for Phoenix Satellite TV); and Bank of China owns Huaying International Corporation Ltd.. Phoenix Satellite TV began broadcasting on August 28, 1998.

On August 21, 1999, the Chinese News & Entertainment Channel (CNE), the London-based European broadcasting service of Phoenix Satellite TV began broadcasting officially in Europe, with coverage of 25 European countries.

On January 1, 2001, Phoenix InfoNews Channel and Phoenix North America Chinese Channel were officially launched. Phoenix Satellite TV successfully landed in the US, for which the CCP media claimed that “it marks that Phoenix Satellite TV has, to a significant extent, covered the whole globe.” [47]

In March 2001, James Murdoch, executive vice chairman of News Corp., son of Rupert Murdoch slanderously called Falun Gong “a dangerous and apocalyptic cult” during a business conference in Los Angeles, USA. He also accused some Western media and Hong Kong media for being enthusiastic about making negative reports on China. [48] After the news got out, many CCP media including the Legal Daily [48], the Liberation Daily, People’s Net [49], and China News Net (run by China News Service) [50] quickly followed it up and publicized his statement. However, according to a VOA report, “Some human rights activists think that James Murdoch said these things to please the Chinese government.” [51]

On March 28, 2002, Star TV under Star Group Limited [52] solely owned by News Corp. was allowed to broadcast on Guangdong cable TV network. This is the first time the Chinese government allowed a foreign TV channel to broadcast via Chinese cable TV network. The condition is that News Corp. assists CCTV-9 to land in the US and Europe. Rupert Murdoch said it’s “a milestone for the development of News Corp. in China” and “the beginning of greater success in China.” [53] News Corp. also stated in its statement that Xu Guangchun, director-general of the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) pointed out that News Corp. should have greater opportunities to grow in China, which is “encouraging.” [54]

The CCP official reports said, “The secret of success for News Corp. is to seek common points with the Chinese government and build a trusting relationship through long-term collaboration.” [53]

Between October 7 and 11, 2003, Rupert Murdoch and others from News Corp. were invited by the Foreign Propaganda Office of the CCP Central Committee (Information Office of the State Council) to visit China. On October 8, Rupert Murdoch was invited by Zeng Qinghong [55], principal of the Party School of the CCP Central Committee to “give a speech to high-ranking CCP officials in charge of ideological affairs.” Professor Yu Guoming from the School of Journalism, People’s University of China described Murdoch’s speech as “compiled through painstaking efforts and filled with flattering words,” from which he could “deeply sense” the speaker’s “desire and anxiety” to enter the Chinese media market. “Aside from Murdoch’s attempt to seek material gains,” however, “many arguments in the speech are poignant and accurate, and they are especially inspiring for us to understand the true value of the media industry.” [56] On October 9, Li Changchun, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee in charge of propaganda met with Rupert Murdoch, board chairman and executive of News Corp. and his group at the People’s Great Hall. Li Changchun expressed his hope that News Corp. “will make greater effort to help the world learn about China and China about the world.” [57]

One year later, on October 28, 2004, SARFT and the Ministry of Commerce jointly published Decree No. 44, [58] “Provisional Rules for Administration of Joint Ventures and Cooperative Enterprises of China and Foreign Countries Producing and Operating Radio and TV Programs”, which took effect on November 28 the same year. The Rules include “enterprises solely owned by foreign venture for making and operating TV broadcasting programs are not permitted,” “the legal representative must be appointed by the Chinese partner,” “the Chinese partner must own no less than 51% of the total stock in a joint venture,” “joint venture enterprises must not make programs on current affairs and political news or similar special feature programs or special column programs,” among other strict rules.

On March 4, 2005, SARFT issued a “Notice on Administering Decree No. 44,” [59] which emphasized that the production of TV programs has a strong “ideological nature,” and [the government] must be “in control of the content,” be aware of the political inclination and background of the foreign partner to prevent “unhealthy foreign ideology and culture from entering the field of program making in the form of joint-venture.” The CCP media soon released news, stating, “This means Sony, Viacom, News Corp. and other foreign film and TV moguls that have already had joint-venture plans in place in China will not be able to expand their film and TV making business within a short period of time.” [60]

On July 13, 2005, Tian Jin [61], deputy head of SARFT emphasized during a national overseas work meeting, “To intensify and strengthen radio, film and television propaganda overseas is the critical requirement to oppose (combat) westernization, separation, infiltration; safeguard state security, strengthen the defense system on the battle ground of public opinion control…the CCP Central Committee and the State Council have always paid close attention to the administration of overseas satellite TV. The Central Committee leaders have given numerous important instructions…We must ensure all satellite TV signals in the jurisdiction area from permitted foreign sources come from the central monitoring platform. This is an inflexible yet simple and clear standard for judging the administration level of various film and TV departments on their control over foreign satellites.” [62]

In August 2005, Beijing officially canceled its plan to allow Murdoch’s News Corp. to expand its broadcasting in various parts of China. [63] On September 19, Bloomberg.com published an article “Murdoch Says News Corp. Has Hit ‘Brick Wall’ in China,” which mentioned that during a New York meeting organized by former US president Clinton, Murdoch admitted that New Corp.’s plan to enter Chinese market was in trouble. He also mentioned that the CCP authorities made promises before but again shut their doors on foreign media corporations. It seems Murdoch has yet to understand that the CCP always wants to unify the world with communist ideology and “bring the earth under its control;” [7] it will only try to “expand its occupation on the battlefield of international public opinion,” [30] and there is no way that the CCP will ever give away the media front.

The true lesson News Corp. has learned is just as the Economist reported, “a decade spent investing time and money to build relationships in China seems to have done Mr. Murdoch little good. Having milked Star TV for its technical expertise, the Chinese [the CCP regime] may well feel they no longer need him.”[64]

1.5 Implementing Spokesperson System to Unify Statement

Since 1993, the Foreign Propaganda Office (the Information Office of the State Council) has been in charge of the press release of the State Council and the coordination of press spokespersons from different departments of the State Council. On December 28, 2004, Zhao Qizheng, head of the Foreign Propaganda Office officially announced that the three-tier news release and spokesperson system had basically been established in the Chinese government. It refers to the news release and spokesperson system of the three tiers, which are the State Council Information Office, various departments of the State Council and the provincial governments. [65]

Obviously, the CCP set up the press spokesperson system in order to, through press release, more effectively give unified statements in their propaganda, cover up human rights abuses, fabricate lies, instigate hatred, and at the same time block any information detrimental to the CCP “good” image.

1) Confusing Concepts and Equating the CCP with China

Spokespersons for Chinese embassies and consulates abroad have long been twisting facts and confusing right and wrong. Whenever there are people criticizing China’s human rights situation and condemning the brutality of the CCP, they would slanderously accuse them of being “anti-China” forces. Here are two examples:

Case 1: On January 16, 2001, Professor Zhang Kunlun, who holds dual citizenship of Canada and China, said during an interview with Canada TV that he returned to China to teach in April 1996. [66] After July 20, 1999, he was arrested many times and cruelly tortured because he practiced Falun Gong. Chinese police officers shocked him with high-voltage electric batons. Zhang Kunlun said, “One police officer with the surname of Zhang said, ‘If you practice Falun Gong, we don’t have to take any responsibility for you. If you are beaten to death, we can tell the public that you have committed suicide.’” Zhang Kunlun was forced to attend brainwashing classes and write repentance statements to renounce his belief. He was also extorted 10,000 RMB Yuan. [67] Two days later, the spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in Canada attacked Zhang Kunlun’s press conference and slanderously accused the Canadian government, NGOs, the Canadian people and the international community that showed support to Professor Zhang of “stirring up a new wave of anti-China campaign and damaging the relationship between China and Canada.” [68]

Case 2: On January 28, 2005, the press spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in Australia made a speech, in which he called the Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party “anti-China articles.” The Nine Commentaries expose how the Communist Party has brutalized the Chinese people and destroyed Chinese culture during its 56-year rule; he also labeled Falun Gong practitioners’ efforts in clarifying the truth and exposing the genocidal persecution of belief by the CCP as “instigative anti-China activities;” he slanderously called Falun Gong, “a counter-revolutionary organization engaging in political activities against China.” [69]

2) Information Blockade

On November 23, 2003, based on the “Notice on improving and enhancing news reporting of unexpected domestic incidents” from the CCP Central Committee Office and the General Office of the State Council, China Ministry of Justice issued Document Sifatong [2003] No.135, entitled “Instruction on reinforcing the propaganda work in justice and administrative system.” It was emphasized in this document that “the judiciary organizations of all levels must strictly follow the requirements of the Foreign Propaganda Office of the CCP Central Committee and the Information Office of the State Council when it comes to reporting unexpected domestic incidents towards outside of China.” “You must take the initiative to report the unexpected incidents to your local CCP Committee, the propaganda departments of local government and your superior judiciary and administrative organization right away. Then you must ask for and follow their instructions on how to report these incidents. As a rule of thumb, you do not publicly report any unexpected incidents occurring within any judiciary or administrative system, mainly including major accidents at production plants, judiciary or human rights issues, the situation of critical prisoners and ‘Falun Gong,’ etc.” [70]

On June 27, 2005, the Propaganda Department of the CCP Committee at North China Electric Power University issued a memo titled, “the regulations of reporting unexpected incidents occurring at North China Electric University.” Three regulations are specified in the memo; “First, based on the verified instructions on our news reporting and the school leaders’ orders, we have created news reporting regulations and started to closely watch and manipulate the public opinions inside and outside the campus. Second, every news broadcast script must be reviewed and approved by the university CCP Standing Committee or by the university’s leaders before it can be published. Third, without the approval of the university’s upper management level, the following unexpected incidents must not be reported, e.g. incidents that involve foreign embassies and consulates in China, foreign diplomats, foreign students; incidents that involve Hong Kong, Macao or Taiwan; major incidents that involve Chinese ethic groups, religion, human rights or “Falun Gong;” and group incidents that involve ‘illegal rallies,’ student movements, riots or other types of group incidents.” [71]

After the big earthquake of magnitude 7.8 hit Wenchuan County, Sichuan Province at 2:28 pm on May 12, 2008 Beijing Time, four report planning meetings were held in China News Service on the same day and the day after. “Reporting guideline was sent out three times, requesting branch offices in the disaster zone to follow the message of Central government, so as to report in concert with headquarter and other offices both inside and outside of China.” “The China News Service re-published news on Central Politburo Standing Committee Meeting twice in time, and also reprinted the important articles from media with authority such as People’s Daily and Xinhua New Agency, etc. Key data like casualties were released following instructions strictly and sensitive issues were handled with cautions.” [72]

According to the Central News Agency correspondent Ren Wenyi’s report from Taipei on June 16, 2008, a human rights advocate Huang Qi from China’s Sichuan Province was arrested in Chengdu on June 10. His mother Pu Wenqing was notified on June 16 that Mr. Huang was charged with “holding state secret illegally” and would be in detention for one month. Ms. Pu said that his son went to distribute relief goods after the Sichuan earthquake. “He stayed in the disaster zone everyday and never came out.” Yet it was unbelievable that the authority accused him of holding state secret unlawfully. Some media reported that Huang Qi’s arrest was due to his statement about grievance of the parents whose children died in the earthquake because of poor quality school buildings. [73]

3) Chinese Communist Regime Instigates People’s Hatred towards Falun Gong and Implements Genocide Policy against Falun Gong

In order to justify its ruthless persecution against Falun Gong, Chinese Communist Regime has to instigate people’s hatred towards Falun Gong by making vicious lies to vilify Falun Gong. The following example is a good illustration of one of CCP’s many forms of hate propaganda: After 263 Falun Gong practitioners have been verified to have been persecuted to death in China, Falun Gong practitioners in San Francisco started a peaceful appeal on August 18, 2001 in front of the Chinese Consulate in San Francisco for 265 consecutive hours to urge China to end its ruthless persecution and to urge the world’s help to rescue those Falun Gong practitioners under illegal custody and under the threat of death. [74] On August 27, 2005, the spokesman for the Chinese Consulate General in San Francisco made a public speech to convey their rage towards Falun Gong practitioners’ public appeal. Moreover, he made false accusations that Falun Gong has caused 1,700 of its practitioners to die and caused countless families to fall apart.” [75]

On July 22, 2002, Mr. Xie Feng, the China news spokesperson in the U.S. urged the international society to “condemn,” “stop,” and “eradicate” Falun Gong in a press conference. [76]

4) Creating a False Facade to Avoid International Criticism

On March 30, 2004, Information Office of the State Council published a white paper titled, “China’s Human Rights Improvements in 2003.” It says, “The local people’s governments of all levels nationwide have started to have or improve their news spokesperson system so as to improve the Chinese people right to know the truth, to supervise the government and to participate in public affairs.” [77] But the truth is that the truth about China’s June 4 Massacre of college students at Tiananmen Square in 1989 or the truth about CCP regime’s persecution against Falun Gong has never once been reported in any media in China as a result of the CCP’s persistent control of all news reports. When a dictatorial regime tries to perfect its news spokesperson system, it has only one purpose — to tighten its grip on information and speech. Since 1991, Information Office of the State Council has published eight white papers on China’s human rights conditions in an attempt to build a false impression to avoid international condemnations on its long lists of human rights violations. [78]

According to the news report by Xinhua Net, the CCP’s official mouthpiece, on March 30, 2005 about People’s Daily (Overseas Edition) interview with Mr. Zhao Qizheng. Zhao said, “Every month mainstream Chinese and western media outlets receive several invitations from China’s Information Office of State Council to press conferences in China. Almost all the issues they are concerned about, such as Taiwan issue and macroscopic economy in China, are covered by these press conferences.” [79] In a reply to the question raised by a China Net reporter, Mr. Zhao said, “AP’s top reporter in Beijing told me that the contents from the Information Office of State Council’s press conference are all their headlines news.” [80]

2. The Expansion of the Chinese Communist Party’s Totalitarian and Dictatorial Ideology to the World

According to the news report by China Guangzhou Net on August 26, 2005, “For the past few years, the CCP and our country have been emphasizing overseas propaganda’s positive effects on opening up our market, winning the international battle against antagonist forces, and winning the diplomatic battles. The Central-level overseas propaganda newspapers, magazines, radio stations, television stations and news agencies alone spend about several billions RMB Yuan every year (1 USD @ 8.2 RMB Yuan). All the provinces, cities and autonomous regions have also started to pour more manpower, resources and money into reinforcing their overseas propaganda.” [81]

CCP has six main overseas propaganda media including Xinhua News Agency, China Radio International, the Chinese Central Television’s international Chinese channel (CCTV-4), the international English channel (CCTV-9), China News Service (CNS in short) and People’s Daily’s overseas edition. Allegedly, “the Central-level media websites have become increasingly influential. They have become an important force of overseas propaganda.” [82] Meanwhile, the United Nation has long ago included the news released by Xinhua News Agency as one of its main sources of reference materials.” [83]

The CCP has secretly weaved an extremely huge “network” in front of people’s eyes both inside and outside of China, through their effort of “hide one’s capacities and bide one’s time”[ 11] in over a dozen years, the CCP’s ideology is now expanding and infiltrating to the outside world through this “network.”

2.1 The Chinese Communist Party’s Main Overseas Propaganda Media and Their Global Coverage

Xinhua News Agency’s Goal: “Bring the Earth under Its Control”

As of the end of 2002, Xinhua News Agency’s news reports supplied over 140 countries and regions and had about 5,000 overseas subscribing households. Some overseas mainstream media outlets are among its subscribers. They include the U.S.A. Today (U.S.) and Science magazine (U.S.), France’s Le Figaro (France) and Paris Match (France), BBC (U.K.) and Daily Telegraph (U.K.) and Pyramid newspaper (Egypt). [82]

In 2007, the news products of the Xinhua News Agency were expanded to over 200 countries and regions. Overseas subscribers increased to over 14500; and special editions were offered to overseas readers in five languages including Chinese, English, French, Spanish and Indonesian. On average, there were 120 pages and more than 3000 articles printed each month. [84]

Xinhua News Agency claimed, “Xinhua News Agency’s articles and photographs are transcribed about 1,000 times in overseas media daily.” “Half of the news reported from AP, AFP and Reuters’ China branch offices are transcribed from or are based on Xinhua New Agency’s reports. The majority of overseas Chinese newspapers are subscribers of Xinhua News Agency.” “Xinhua News Agency’s reports are an important source of information for foreign media’s branch offices in China, as well as overseas journalists stationed in China.” [82]

According to Mr. Tang Runhua, Head of Xinhua News Agency’s Research Institute, “In order to enhance the effectiveness of our overseas propaganda, Xinhua News Agency established a strategy to use domestic news reports in our main overseas propaganda. In 2004, 72% of our English reports were transcribed by foreign media and among them, 79% were China news report.” [85]

In October 2007, at the 17th CCP National Congress, Xinhua News Agency was emphasized again as the “main propaganda channel to the outside world”. In order to enhance its capability of influencing world opinion, vice chief editor Liu Jiang of Xinhua News Agency proposed to “make China News as the breakthrough of broadcasting to the outside world, and to make the Asia-Pacific region as the major battlefield of competition with the main western media.” Considering the media effect on public, Liu Jiang said that “timely reporting is the key to form the influence power of a media”, and he claimed that “in 2007, Xinhua News Agency‘s international news were faster than three main western media AP, Reuters and AFP with close to 200 pieces of first release report, and more than 220 pieces were faster than two of those three news agencies.” [86]

China News Service Is the Main Source of Information for Media in Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and Overseas Chinese-Language Media

China News Service (CNS) is the main source of information for media in Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and overseas Chinese-language media. [80] CNS claimed that they had directly supplied articles to overseas Chinese-language media for 55 years. With the strong support from CCP government, CNS will play even bigger and more active role in foreign propaganda arena, and will continue leading the overseas Chinese-language media. [87] CNS supplies word and photo reports to 300 overseas Chinese-language media each day, and has contract with 40 overseas Chinese-language media to provide them with exclusive CNS news. Each year, CNS provides 8000 page layouts to about 20 overseas Chinese-language media. [88]

CNS Overseas Center is a professional news supply and layout agency under CNS for overseas Chinese-language media. According to CNS, it has been “in powerful function” in terms of “solid implementing China’s foreign propaganda policy” since its establishment in 1996. In the end of 2002, the center started to provide original news comments and exclusive news reports to be published on various newspapers. Especially for its special column of “Current Affair Talk”, the center has formed a news comment team and released one article per day in the past five years. Altogether they have produced 1460 articles, which were all adopted on Chinese-language media in New York and Los Angeles, and selectively used in Saint Paul, Paris, Vancouver and other areas. [89]

On October 11, 2006, CNS vice chief editor Xia Chunping visited the US Asian Culture Media Group in New York. He also signed article-supply contracts with several media underneath it including China Press USA (Qiao Bao), SinoVision Inc., Sino American Times, etc. [90]

China Radio International’s (CRI) Programs Cover the World

China Radio International (CRI) broadcasts around the world in 43 different languages. By the end of 2006, more than 1100 total hours of programs were aired daily and covered the whole world. CRI has established 30 reporter stations globally in major countries and regions. [91] It has contracts with local radio stations or rents hours at local radio stations in more than ten different countries and regions. In addition, it has formed partnerships with radio stations and TV stations in many countries and regions around the world to which it sends over programs for broadcasting. [92]

CCTV-9 Broadcast Reaches 98% of the Earth’s Surface

CCTV-9, CCTV‘s English channel is China’s first TV channel targeting mainstream audience in foreign countries. Since its start on September 25, 2000, after five years of development, it has become CCP’s English mouthpiece, broadcasting 24-hour per day globally. [93] Its signal, after digital compression, is aired through PanAm Satellite (PAS) 8, 9, 10 and AsiaSat 2 and 3S over the land and ocean in Asia, Australia, Africa, America, Europe, west Pacific Ocean and Middle East. It is then broadcasted through many different forms of partnership with cable TV stations in countries in these regions. [92] For example, CCTV-9 formed a partnership with News Corp. to have its programs broadcasted in its Fox Cable Network and Time Warner Cable Network in the U.S. [80]

CCTV-4 Programs Basically Reach the Entire World

CCTV-4, a Chinese-language TV channel, targets overseas Chinese and residents in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. It broadcasts news programs around the clock. Its signals, after being digitally compressed, are broadcasted through many satellites. Basically, CCTV-4 has achieved its goal of reaching almost the entire globe through transmitted satellite signal and its primary target regions through the directly broadcast satellite signal. [94]

People’s Daily’s Overseas Edition Is Circulated in More Than 80 Countries and Regions

People’s Daily’s overseas edition is the CCP Central Committee’s official newspaper. [95] It is one of the five CCP’s main media for overseas propaganda. [96] Its target readers are overseas Chinese students and scholars, overseas Chinese and residents in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. Besides China, it is also printed in New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Tokyo, Paris, Toronto, Sydney, Jakarta, Surabaya, etc. It is distributed in over 80 countries and regions around the world. [78]

China Daily Is Circulated in Over 150 Different Countries and Regions

China Daily is China’s first nationwide English newspaper. Its target readers in China are foreigners staying in China, e.g. foreign diplomats in China, foreign business corporations in China, foreign news agencies’ offices in China, foreign scholars and experts working in China and foreign tourists visiting China. Its target readers outside of China are government officials, scholars conducting research on issues regarding China, business and trade organizations and college libraries. In New York, London and Hong Kong, it publishes its North America version, European version and Hong Kong version, respectively. It is circulated in over 150 countries and regions around the world. [97]

20% of the Hits on the CCP Central Committee’s Mouthpieces Came from Outside of China

People’s Daily, Xinhua News Agency, China Radio International, China Daily, China Internet News Center and CCTV publish or broadcast news reports in many different languages. According to statistics in 2004, 10% of the hits on their websites came from outside of China. [80]

In 2007, total 7801 Mbps Internet bandwidth was connected to the major CCP central-level websites, which provide 930 news channels and 13817 special news programs. The readers were from more than 200 countries and regions. Out of over 100M page views everyday, 20% were from outside China. Among those websites, with 9 languages and 11 editions, China Net has become the main window of CCP’s foreign propaganda. [98]

China Radio International‘s “CRI Online” is published in 42 languages and 48 phonetics over the Internet. According to incomplete statistics, close to 15000 websites world-wide have linked to the homepages of “CRI Online”’s various language editions. [91]

2.2 Reinforce Overseas Propaganda via Western Media

At the same time when Chinese Communist regime strengthened its overseas propaganda via its mouthpieces, in order to control foreign journalists in China to ensure that their reports do not go beyond the scope of the CCP’s regulation, China’s State Council issued Document No. 47 as early as January 19, 1990 – “Regulation stipulations on Foreign Journalists and Foreign Media Outlets in China.” It was specified in this regulation that “Foreign journalists must get approval from foreign affairs departments, foreign affairs offices in governments at provincial, municipal and regional levels, prior to their planned interview with governmental departments or other work units, regions adopting ‘open-up’ policy or regions not yet opened up. Violation of the regulation will result in punishment of the responsible person(s) by Chinese public security organs based on the seriousness of the violation.” [99] Correspondingly, Foreign Propaganda Office of the CCP Central Committee established Bureau One, which was, Information Bureau “to provide service for foreign journalists for interviews inside China” at the same time. [18] Let’s take a look at how Chinese Communist regime provides such “service” for foreign journalists through the following examples.

After the outbreak of SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) in November 2002 in Guangdong Province, the Chinese Communist regime tried its best to cover up the real situation of the epidemic; as a result, China lost the opportunity to take precautions and preventions against SARS. In March 2003, SARS spread to different countries via Hong Kong. [100] On April 6 of the same year, Pekka Aro, an International Labor Organization official, died from SARS in Beijing. However, three days before his death, Minister of Public Health, Zhang Wenkang stressed again at a press conference for domestic and foreign reporters that “the epidemic has been under effective control” and “it is safe to work in China, to live in China and to travel in China.” [101] On April 8, Dr. Jiang Yanyong, a surgeon of the military hospital, 301 Hospital, wrote to the U.S. journal TIME to expose the fact that China’s Ministry of Public Health was covering up the true situation of SARS, cheating the public and international society. [102] Mr. Jiang became the main focus of global media the next day. Phone calls came in one after another from AP, Deutsche Presse Agentur and Agence France-Presse, trying to arrange an interview with Mr. Jiang. In the evening of that day, officials of 301 Hospital personally talked to Mr. Jiang and reminded him, “You cannot accept interviews by overseas journalists, as this is the rule set for military personnel.” [103]

On April 10, WHO publicly criticized Beijing’s epidemic reporting policy: “In Beijing, only a few hospitals report SARS cases on a daily basis. The tracking system is problematic. It will lead to the spreading of the disease.” [104]

On May 7, three journalists of TIME who learned that Ministry of Public Health of China and SARA Prevention and Treatment Teamwork Group of WHO would investigate in Hebei Province in mid-May, went to Guancun Town of Gu’an County in Langfang City, Hebei Province to interview local peasants and took pictures. As soon as Bureau of Foreign Propaganda of Langfang City heard it, officials from the bureau rushed to Langfang City and “rejected their interview” with the excuse that these journalists “didn’t go through due procedures.” In the morning of May 8, two journalists of a Swiss newspaper arrived at rural area of Zhuozhou City directly from Beijing, the staff of local foreign affairs department in Zhuozhou City, after being informed, followed them for two hours and eventually terminated their interview activities. [105]

On May 21, Party Secretary of Hebei Provincial CCP Committee, Bai Keming received a report on “Foreign Journalists Violates Regulations and Goes to Hebei Province to Interview.” He called Zhao Qizheng, director of the Foreign Propaganda Office of the CCP Central Committee. He expressed his viewpoints in this matter, “We may loosen our restrictions and allow foreign journalists to come to Hebei Province for interviews. We may show them the places they are allowed to see and let them report on how local officials help to prevent and treat SARS.” The Foreign Propaganda Office of CCP Central Committee then passed the words to Department of Propaganda of Hebei Province CCP Committee. According to Xiang Jinke [106], vice head of Propaganda Department of Hebei Province CCP Committee and Director of Information Office of Hebei Provincial Government, “With the direct support from the Bureau One of the Foreign Propaganda Office of CCP Central Committee, we made immediate plans to invite foreign journalists to come to Hebei Province and conduct interviews on how we prevent and treat SARS in our province and our detailed treatment plans. The Foreign Propaganda Office of CCP Central Committee helped us invite fairly influential foreign media such as Associated Press Television News of the U.S., Reuters, Agence France-Presse and Asahi Shimbun of Japan… In addition, Foreign Propaganda Office arranged journalists from Xinhua News Agency, China News Service, CCTV and China Radio International to come along with foreign journalists. They took pictures for future reference.” The place of the interview was designated to be Baoding City, because “In mid-May, Ministry of Public Health of China and SARA Prevention and Treatment Teamwork Group of WHO were conducting investigation in Baoding City, the city has relatively good facility and condition for receptions.” [105]

On May 27, at noon, Party Secretary of Hebei Provincial CCP Committee Bai Keming gave an explicit instruction on how to prepare materials for the interview and how to answer questions from the journalists. He said, “Be sure to be prepared to answer all kinds of questions, including questions unfriendly in nature… When answering their questions, keep calm.” Zhang Qunsheng, member of standing committee of Hebei Provincial CCP Committee and Head of Propaganda Department in Hebei Province convoked a meeting for all officials involved in different aspects of SARS prevention to study the instruction by Bai Keming.

In the morning of May 28, Deputy Director of Bureau One of the Foreign Propaganda Office of the CCP Central Committee, Guo Weimin led the journalists group and arrived in Baoding City. Allegedly, “when the journalists entered the province, leaders of foreign propaganda bureau of provincial and municipal levels were the only people leading the team at the entrance of highways,” and “with meticulous planning and careful implementation, the journalists were allowed to ask any questions and were able to stroll around and conduct interviews freely… All these impressed foreign journalists as well as media outlets from central government favorably. Many media gave extensive coverage of the interviews in Baoding City.”

Xiang Jinke, Vice Head of Propaganda Department of CCP Hebei Provincial Committee and Director of Information Office of Hebei Provincial Government, learned a great deal from whole planning of the interview. He said, “Inviting foreign reporters to interview us is an undertaking with heavy political and strategic connotations…. From the beginning to the end, Bai Keming, Party Secretary of Hebei Provincial CCP Committee was the general scheme planner and director; Zhang Qunsheng, member of standing committee of Hebei Provincial CCP Committee and Head of Propaganda Department of Hebei Province, was responsible for the detailed implementation.” “As long as we take full advantage of our conditions to control public opinion and to be smart in using foreign resources, make constant breakthroughs in our notions, methods, schemes, and formalities, we will have immense potential in areas of foreign propaganda.” [105]

This is only one of the numerous examples wherein Chinese communist regime takes advantage of foreign media in its overseas propaganda. In January 2005, Chinese communist regime re-publicized the so-called “Tiananmen Self-immolation” incident. “With the arrangement of Information Office of the State Council, a journalist team composed of reporters from Xinhua News Agency, People’s Daily, China Radio International, China News Service, Hong Kong Wenweipo, Associated Press, and CNN interviewed the survivors of the “Self-immolation” incident at Zhengzhou Prison on January 18.” [107] Soon after that, Associated Press published a report on the interview of “Self-immolation” survivor. Through the words of the interviewee, the report repeated CCP’s lies and slanders defaming Falun Gong. This report has been transcribed by many overseas media. [108]

When the Chinese Communist regime staged the “Tiananmen Self-immolation” incident in 2001, an information source from inside the Ministry of Public Security revealed that “On the eve of Chinese Lunar New Year (January 23, 2001), after the self-immolation incident occurred, policemen detained six or seven journalists on the spot who are reporters for CNN, Associated Press, Agence France-Presse stationed in Beijing. The police impounded their videotape and negatives, and requested them to sign a statement to admit they had conducted illegal interview and would never make the same mistake again. They were released afterwards.” [109] Four years later, when the Chinese communist regime made special arrangement for AP journalists to interview “self-immolation” survivor, the way AP journalists were treated and their behavior were completely different from four years ago.

In early 2008, Liu Qi, Politburo member of the CCP Central Committee, Party Secretary of the Beijing CCP Committee, chairman and the CCP Group Secretary of the Beijing Olympics Organization Committee, spoke about the foreign propaganda work related to the Beijing Olympics. He demanded that “CCP committee and government of each level should pay high attention to it. And the leaders of each level should learn how to deal with foreign media.” “We should make full use of the Olympic News Center and the Olympic News Center for non-registered reporters. Through the forms of press conference, special topic exhibition, and foreign reporter group interview, etc.”, enlarge the propaganda scale. “Serve and manage well of foreign reporters during their news coverage period inside China. We should enhance the interview route system, such as select interview sites purposefully, make thorough transportation plan and various other plans… initiate interview topics, arrange interview activities, prepare news materials, and so on. Really improve our abilities of interaction with foreign media.” [110]

The famous Belgian Sinologist Simon Leys (his real name is Pierre Ryckmans) wrote in his book Chinese Shadows: “Things being what they are, it seems to me that the feeblest hack should be able to write a report on China…without leaving his desk…[If] he actually decided to look at China for himself…He would make the same tours with that same guides, sleep in the same hotels, visit the same institutions, meet the same people who would tell him the same things…always conforming to an unvarying and unreal ritual…belonging to an abstract world conceived by Maoist bureaucrats especially for foreign guests…In the tours for foreign visitors, always superbly organized, anything that might be unpredictable, unexpected, spontaneous, or improvised is ruthlessly eliminated…Yet most travelers who ‘do’ China in this way…look favorably on their experience. There is plenty of variety in the trips and the days are more than full.” (Chinese Shadows, By Simon Leys, New York: Viking Press, P1-2) [111]

3. Establishing the Global Ideology United Front with a Variety of Styles and Means

3.1 Infiltration through Radio, Film, Video, Books, Magazines and Comprehensive Cultural Exchange Activities

Broadcasting

In September 2003, China Media Group (CMG) CCP Group member, the Director of China Radio International (CRI), CCP CRI Branch Committee secretary Li Dan stated during his interview by reporters, “During the Cultural Revolution, our international broadcasting (which was called ‘Radio Peking’ before the 90s) exported revolution. Most of the feedbacks from our audiences came from Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia, Philippines, etc. They were all carrying out revolutions at that time, so they all listened to our broadcasting on a daily basis for guidance on their revolution undertaking. Our program hosts became stars in their countries.”

Li Dan believed that, “The most significant advantage of China Radio International was the ability to penetrate border blockade under any circumstance, such as during war time, both sides definitely will take actions to block messages from opposing side penetrating into their own controlling territory, this is the so-called information blockade. Under such circumstance, television would need cable or satellite dish to be able to reach local audience, printed media could no longer be promulgated, except through air drops; as far as Internet is concerned, it could be completely sealed off through technical means. Yet, radio broadcasting could not be stopped, even with jamming, it can adjust its frequencies, therefore it has significant mobility, flexibility and broad space for maneuvering.” [112]

In September 1974, based on the bilateral cultural exchange between China and Canada, Li Dan was sent to study in Canada by the China Radio International. He said, “I did in-depth research and investigation on the western news broadcast. I started doing research also on our own news broadcast theory and practice. Based on the need and characteristics of our work, we planned to promulgate our propaganda in the form of news reporting.”

In 1984, Li Dan went to Stanford University in the U.S. as a visiting scholar. It was reported that the “Professional Journalists Project” Unit at Stanford University provided a hefty sum of scholarship, and Li Dan was representing China, so it was counted as on official business but self financed. Li Dan told reporters, “After a year, because we need to study and understand how U.S. Congress works, I transferred to the School of Communication at the American University in Washington D.C. I focused my main effort to practice news covering at the U.S. Congress, and I had fairly thorough understanding on the internal situation, internal channels, public rules, relationship between the Congress and the news media.” “I felt that I truly permeated into the cells of the American society, thoroughly and acutely understand the American social and inter-personal relationship.” [113]

I returned back to China in 1986, and mainly focused on how to achieve our goal in disseminating our propaganda to foreign countries through news broadcast.” [114]

Propaganda toward Foreign Countries via Film and Video

On April 15, 2004, the Foreign Propaganda Office of the Tianjin City CCP Committee (Information Office of Tianjin City Government) established the implementation details for the “Intensification of effort on propaganda toward foreign countries). This included “Consolidate resources of the entire city on propaganda toward foreign countries, establish inter-departmental cooperation mechanism for Foreign Propaganda, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, Foreign Tourism, Culture, Taiwan Affairs, and Overseas Chinese Affairs, form a unified structure for the Foreign Propaganda. Make the focal point of Foreign Propaganda in sync with seeking overseas business and capital investment, as well as possible infusion of capital, technology and human resources.” “Make Europe, America, Northeastern Asia, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan as our main objective,” “Fully utilize the video and film supply channel that we have established with the world renowned CNN (US), strengthen the topic selection criteria and policy, further improve the quantity and quality of supplied footage.” [115]

On February 2, 2005, the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) announced and issued the “Focal Point (Guidelines) on Radio, Film and Television Propaganda for 2005.” The focal points included “Improving the style, methodology, means for the foreign propaganda, fully consider the needs and custom of the overseas audience….significantly broaden the undertaking to push foreign propaganda of radio, film and television to the worldwide arena, execute all the details well to ensure the propaganda become an integral part of the local culture, accelerate the exchange and cooperation on a worldwide basis for our radio, film and television.” [116]

On July 13 of the same year, Tian Jin, a member of the CCP group at the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television, and deputy director of the Administration [117] emphasized at the National Conference on Overseas Radio, Film and Television Effort, “Intensify and strengthen radio, film and television propaganda overseas is the critical requirement for anti-westernization, anti-separation and anti-infiltration; safeguard state security, strengthen the defense system on the battle ground of public opinion control….Radio, film and television propaganda overseas is an essential and critical part of our Party’s foreign propaganda, and it is a global and strategic undertaking to serve the Party and the Nation.” [62]

On January 27, 2008, Wang Taihua, vice Head of the Propaganda Department of CCP Central Committee, secretary of the CCP group at the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television, and director of the Administration [118] made a speech at the National Conference for Directors in Radio, Film and TV System: “The primary political task in our system at present and in a later period of time, is to study further, propagate and carry out the main spirit of the 17th CCP National Congress… embed the core socialism values into various aspect of our work…hasten our steps to go outside… continue close cooperation with the work of foreign affairs, foreign aid and foreign propaganda…extend coverage in key nations, neighborhood countries and areas… actively explore the localization strategy…solid enhance the focus and effect of foreign propaganda.” [119]

Foreign Propaganda through Publications

China Foreign Language Publishing and Distribution Administration, semi ministry organization, is under the CCP Central Committee and is directly led by the Foreign Propaganda Office of the CCP Central Committee (the Information Office of the State Council). It is said that it is “a news publication agency that is mainly responsible for the Party’s and nation’s mission of foreign propaganda by means of books, periodicals and the Internet. China Foreign Language Publishing and Distribution Administration has a history of more than 50 years.” [120]

Yang Zhengquan [121], Deputy Director of the Foreign Propaganda Office of the CCP Central Committee, and Director and Party Group Secretary of the China Foreign Language Publishing and Distribution Administration said, “Over the past 50 years, China Foreign Language Publishing and Distribution Administration published and distributed nearly 1.1 billion copies of books and periodicals. They have been distributed to over 180 countries and regions of the world. They have contributed to the introduction of the new-born People’s Republic (of China) to the world.” [122]

In 1994, China Foreign Language Publishing and Distribution Administration specifically started a new journal International Communications, which was alleged to be a journal “taking the study and promotion of foreign propaganda as its responsibility” and “exploring the art of disseminating the image of China and seeking the channels to reach the whole world.” Its target readers are “personnel of media outlets in charge of foreign propaganda, China’s foreign propaganda professionals at central governmental, municipal and county level, all foreign affairs professionals in different ministries of the CCP Central Committee, faculty and students in the areas of foreign propaganda at universities, state level foreign affairs professionals.” [123]

Yang Zhengquan also said, “Doing a good job in the foreign propaganda through books and periodicals is the focus of the Administration. Books and periodicals are one of the main measures of conducting foreign propaganda.” “Dedicated to the promotion of Marxism, to the promotion of the socialism with Chinese characteristics,” “Creating a good environment of international public opinion, upholding the interest and maintaining the security of the country, are the fundamental purpose of our doing foreign propaganda.” [122]

In October 2004, Yu Yongzhan, Vice Director of General Administration of Press and Publication of People’s Republic of China, commented during an interview with a journalist that to carry out the strategy of internationalizing China’s publication activities “is a pressing political task…In the case of underdeveloped countries and regions and with the foreign propaganda publications that are highly political, we may use the non-trading approaches more often. In the case of developed countries and general publications, we may more often use economic trading approaches…Copyright transfer and co-publication should be the basic ways to internationalize China’s publication activities.” [124]

In late July 2005, Information Office of the State Council, and General Administration of Press and Publication jointly distributed a circular entitled “How to Implement the Plan of Promoting Chinese Books to the World”. The circular says, the Information Office of the State Council will provide financial assistance to foreign publishing agencies for their translation work when they purchase or are given free copyrights from domestic publishing agencies. [125] On August 30, Wu Wei, deputy director of the Third Bureau of the Information Office of the State Council said at the 2005 Beijing International Publication Forum, “Based on the success in financially assisting the French Publishing House to publish Chinese books, (we) timely introduced the Program to Popularize Chinese Books Abroad (also known as the PPCBA Plan).” Its main content is “by way of providing the translation fee, encourage foreign publishing businesses and agencies to publish and distribute books about China. [126] According to official reports in Chinese media, “Up until the 2nd half of 2004, our government has signed contracts with nine famous publishing agencies in six countries including US, UK, France, Singapore, Japan and Australia to provide about two million RMB Yuan of financial aid to help publish more than 110 types of Chinese books.”[125]

Cultural Exchange

On September 1, 1999, the 1999 Paris-China Culture Week co-sponsored by the Foreign Propaganda Office of the Central CCP and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) held an opening ceremony at the lawn in front of the headquarter of UNESCO. According to Chinese official media, “One of the major planners of this event, the director of the Information Office of the State Council, Zhao Qizheng was very satisfied with the outcome of this culture week… Zhao also answered questions raised by the French audience, including questions on reformation of Chinese state-owned enterprises, construction of market economy, unification of Taiwan and Mainland China, reformation of Chinese characters, the current status of news and press in China, the economical and cultural exchange between China and France, the construction of Three Gorges Dam, as well as outlaw of ‘Falun Gong’ organization in China.” [127]

Between August 24 and September 17, 2000, “Chinese Culture Touring America,” an event engaged in foreign propaganda was launched in the US. The Foreign Propaganda Office of the CCP Central Committee planned and organized this event, which was comprised of three parts: exhibition, art performance, and keynote speech. During the nearly one-month-long event, the Chinese cultural organizations visited nine major US cities. The Chinese official media claimed, “This event is China’s first successful trial in disseminating our propaganda to foreign countries by means of public relationship.” [128]

On October 28, 2003, CCTV and Association of Overseas Chinese in France jointly hosted an entertainment evening party “hand-in-hand.” The Chairman of Association of Overseas Chinese in France, Lin Jiazhe said in his open speech that he was very excited to have the opportunity to be part of the Chinese Cultural Year activities. He praised the CCTV to be “spiritual food for overseas Chinese in France.” [129]

In October 2003, Vice President of College of Journalism and Communication, Shanghai International Studies University, Guo Ke [130] wrote in his published paper, “the Information Office of the State Council spent a huge amount of money worth of 5 million dollars to launch various events in major US cities, which was meant to build public relationship. It has gained pretty good propaganda outcome.” [131]

On May 13, 2004, the director of the Foreign Propaganda Office of the CCP Central Committee, Zhao Qizheng stated in his speech at Tsinghua University, “Our global propaganda needs to get close to the cultural background and needs of the foreign audiences. It needs to be conducted through multiple channels in parallel: press release, newspaper, book, radio, television, internet, cultural exchange as well as foreign propaganda from the effort of our entire population.” When Zhao Qizheng talked about “cultural exchange,” he said, “No one could say no to culture or cultural exchange. We must reinforce cultural exchange.” [29]

On October 26, 2005, editor of State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs Chen Weiyuan wrote in his article “What the ‘Chinese-French Cultural Year’ Had Brought to Us,” “The success of the Chinese-French Cultural Year is quite an inspiration for our overseas propaganda work. Taking the approach of cultural exchange in overseas propaganda will have a far-reaching and lasting effect and will be well received by the audience… Culture is a ‘soft’ component of our nation’s power. Cultural diplomacy is a ‘soft’ dissemination of our nation’s will. Compared with economical diplomacy and political diplomacy, cultural diplomacy is able to have our target audience unknowingly accept (our propaganda). Such cultural infiltration through subtle influence cannot be underestimated. [132]

3.2 To Defeat the Criticism on Human Rights by “International Anti-China Forces,” the Chinese Communist Party Raises the Banner of Upholding Human Rights

After the CCP seized the power and established its regime, for a long period of time, “human rights” in China was a taboo word for theoretical discussion. People dared not mention the two words “human rights.” Wang Mi, an editor in Sichuan People’s Publishing Company, said, “To regard human rights as a patent exclusively inherited and owned by the capitalists society restricts us from actively participating in human rights areas in the Untied Nation and is not beneficial to our fighting against human rights attacks from Western countries. During the late 80s and early 90s in the last century, western countries directed their human rights attacks against China immediately after the collapse of Soviet Union and East Europe at the end of the cold war. Facing with strong attacks against Chinese human rights issues, Jiang Zemin and other CCP central leaders requested specifically the initiation of studies in human rights issues in order to respond to and counter the attacks.” [133]

On March 15, 2004, Dong Yunhu [18], the Director of Seventh Bureau of the Foreign Propaganda Office of CCP Central Committee, said in his article published in People’s Daily, “During the late 80s and early 90s in the last century, dramatic changes occurred in Soviet Union and East Europe. The international hostile forces enhanced their anti-China attacks on “human rights” issues. To fight against their human rights attack, the CCP Central Committee with General Secretary Jiang Zemin being the kernel leader summarized the practice of human rights development in modern China and the world, and re-studied human rights issues. From an angle of struggle against overseas forces, they raised and provided clear answers to the issue of whether the socialist China should raise the banner upholding human rights. In 1989, Jiang Zemin and other central leaders clearly pointed out, ‘We need to make it clear to people that our democracy is the broadest democracy of the people, and the socialist China is most respectful to human rights.’ From then on, human rights have become a key point of Chinese propaganda towards foreign countries.” [134]

In Oct. 1990, Overview of the International Human Rights Covenants edited and written by Dong Yunhu and Liu Wuping who were teaching at the Party School of the CCP Central Committee was officially published. Dong stated that the book was originated from a human rights study project that he conducted, which the CCP Central Committee had assigned to him in response to the need to fight against overseas forces.” [133]

Wang Xuexian, Deputy Director of the International Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who was responsible for Human Rights Affairs, once said, “From January to March this year (1991), I attended the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. This book provided me with an important theoretic foundation and a fighting tool. …It supplied us who have been engaged in the struggling for the foreign affairs, especially for the international human rights area with a sharp weapon.”

On March 21, 1991, CCTV broadcast the same content in “the News Line” and “the Evening News,” “Theoretically, this book totally and systematically made a clear basic distinction from the viewpoints of human rights between the Marxism and the Capitalism. It applied the basic standpoint, views and ways of Marxism to analyze and discuss the historical development of the concept of human rights.” [133]

Wang Mi, who took part as the on-duty Editor of the Overview, claimed, “On November 1, 1991, the Foreign Propaganda Office (Information Office of the State Council) published China’s first human rights white paper “The Chinese Human Rights Status.” …in front of the whole world, the human rights banner was raised up in a bold and assured manner.” Dong Yunhu, who partook in the white paper drafting, was one of the chief draftsmen. In the same year, the Party School of the CCP Central Committee made an exception, promoting him as an Associate Professor; three years later, another exception was made for him, he became a Professor of the Party School. [133] In October 1995, he was promoted to the Director of the Human Rights Research Office of the Foreign Propaganda Office, and in June 1997, he was advanced as the Director of the Seventh Bureau of the State Council Information Office and concurrently held the post as Vice-Chairman and General Secretary of the China Human Rights Research Association. [135]

In October 1997, Chinese government signed “International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.” On October 5, 1998, at the United Nations headquarters, Qin Huasun, the Chinese Ambassador to the UN, signed “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” [136] Nine months later, the CCP regime launched a large-scale persecution against Falun Gong practitioners.

3.3 Developing the Internet, Opening up New Channels for Overseas Infiltration

On January 1, 1997, the website for the governmental foreign propaganda, China Internet Information Center (China Net), established by the Foreign Propaganda Office of CCP Central Committee became an important platform for the CCP in its overseas news report. [137] In May of the same year, the Information Office of the State Council passed down “The Notices on Using the World Wide Web to Unfold Overseas News Propaganda (Office Document [1997] No. 1),” which stipulated that “Information Office of the State Council in using the World Wide Web to develop overseas news propaganda uses categorical management, and plans the coordination of news propaganda entering the World Wide Web (referred to as entering the web hereafter) on the whole.” “News propaganda work units entering the web must submit applications to the Information Office of the State Council for examination and approval.” “The content of Internet news propaganda designed for overseas in every news propaganda work unit must uniformly enter the web through the CCP Central Committee’s foreign propaganda information platform and cannot enter the web by oneself through other means, even less so, can it enter the web from overseas.” [138]

On May 9, 2000, the Propaganda Department and the Foreign Propaganda Office of CCP Central Committee passed down the “Compendium for the World Wide Web News Propaganda Enterprise Development (2000-2002).” This document brought forth the guiding tenet and the purpose in constructing the enterprise of Internet news propaganda. It also confirmed the first group of important news propaganda websites – China Internet Information Center, People’s Daily, Xinhua News Agency, China Radio International (CRI) and China Daily [126] – as the backbone. Together with the “interlinking of CCP Central Committee’s various news propaganda websites, the CCP Central Committee and local news propaganda websites and overseas consulates and embassies,” they form an “intimate collaboration of World Wide Web news propaganda system.” Search engines of China’s World Wide Web news propaganda system only allow visitors to search news propaganda domain names and information contents that are approved by the Foreign Propaganda Office, and offer directories and navigation services. “China Net, CRI Online and China Daily websites handle the major responsibilities of foreign propaganda.” [139]

On May 10, 2000, The Center for International Communications Studies of Tsinghua University hosted a “News Promulgation in the Internet Age” seminar. Information Office of the State Council Director, Zhao Qizheng said, “China entered every era late by several decades or even a century, but in entering the Internet age this time, it is not late. Instead, it is almost at the same pace as Europe and the U.S. Furthermore, each year, our Internet users have been growing at a rate in between 200% to 400%.” [140]

Starting from March 25, 2002, the Foreign Propaganda Office of CCP Central Committee (Information Office of State Council) published the so-called “Falun Gong Memo” in those anti-Falun Gong columns of almost all overseas embassies’ websites, fabricated news to slander Falun Gong, and carried on the brainwashing propaganda toward people outside China to instigate hatred. [141]

On November 14, 2003, according to the information publicly released by research investigator Huang Fengwu, from Fifth Bureau [18] of the Foreign Propaganda Office: [142]

As for China Daily Website: “the number of news reports increased from average 200 scripts daily in July 2000 to average more than 800 daily in 2001.” “China Daily Website not only publishes news on its own website, but also has agreements to provide news for nearly ten media agencies or organizations including Reuter, the England Financial Times, Dow Jones, DATATIMES, China InfoBank, Asia information, Channel NewsAsia and others. These agencies and organizations reprint our news every day. With the aid of their global influence, their publication channels, and promotion channels, we have achieved ‘Borrows other’s ship to go out to the sea’.” “More and more overseas people have taken the China Daily Website as an important channel to obtain news and information about China.”

As for Xinhua Net, his comment was: In 2001, “When publishing news report in guiding readers to study General Secretary Jiang Zemin’s important theory of the “Three Representatives,” and to expose and denounce Falun Gong, Xinhua Net and Xinhua News Agency’s Domestic Section, Photograph Section put joint effort in reporting those topics, and their reports are influential, the number of scripts is huge. It has an important impact at home and abroad. Many scripts were not only reprinted by domestic media frequently, but also cited by overseas Chinese and western mainstream media. It led to very good propaganda outcome.”

China Radio International website was praised as follows: “In 2001, based on its own characteristics, China Radio International was clear about its role as a radio station reaching out to overseas audience without leaving domestic broadcast behind. It established both Chinese and English homepage; in additional, it opened seven foreign languages channels. It played an important role in broadcasting important events such as the grand scene of the conferences of National People’s Congress (NPC) and the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), and in exposing and denouncing Falun Gong.” [142]

In 2003, the vice-chief-editor of Xinhua News Agency, senior reporter Xia Lin published an article in “Chinese Media Report “ (1st issue of 2003), he claimed, “State Development Planning Committee gave 75 million RMB Yuan as the initial investment to the fundamental development of five important media agencies’ propaganda websites. Ministry of Finance gave a certain amount of annual operation fund to five propaganda websites of China’s mainstream media. With the support of Ministry of Information Industry, the Foreign Propaganda Office of CCP Central Committee, on behalf of the CCP Central Committee’s seven media websites, signed the agreement with China Telecom Group and got 50% discount of usage fee for telecommunication lines. To increase the transmission to overseas, according to the same policy, five important propaganda websites of China mainstream media signed the contract with Genuity Corporation in the U.S, and installed a mirror website with 100M bandwidth in the U.S. After the website was launched, the page-view from the overseas jumped 2 to 3 times.” [143]

Conclusion

Numerous investigation results from World Organization to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong (WOIPFG) show that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a clear and strategic plan in its overseas propaganda serving to infiltrate the communist ideology. The main targets for the CCP’s brainwashing scheme include middle and upper class in their target countries, such as people in political circles, business circles, journalism professions, scholars, and overseas Chinese, “because they control either the political or the economic power and have the influence on the ideology and public opinion of those countries.” [35]

The Chinese Communist Party fully destroyed traditional culture of Chinese people and forcibly instilled communist ideology into all nationalities in China. The CCP has thus committed the largest spiritual persecution in human history. This report is aimed at prompting the international society to become alert and realize the fact that because the Chinese Communist Party’s crimes mostly are committed inside China, and the CCP fully controls the information at home and blocks the information abroad, the societies both at home and abroad can hardly know the truth. When the CCP camouflage the communist fallacy with Chinese characteristic and infiltrate it to foreign countries by means of cultural exchange and news reports, people are brainwashed unknowingly. Wherever the communist ideology successfully infiltrates, degeneration and moral corruption is inevitable. Under the brainwashing propaganda of the CCP, in front of material interests and temptation that has become the commonly used leverage by the CCP, people’s desire for material well-being are constantly growing and they are gradually losing the sense to distinguish between right and wrong and the moral strength to uphold justice. In the long run, there will no longer be justice in the society; nor will there be righteousness in the human world. The fatal detriment brought forth by the so-called “communism with Chinese characteristic” (translator’s note: this is a term coined by the CCP to justify all the policy changes it has made which are different or absent from the original Marxism) to the morality and civilization of mankind, to world peace and advancement, is being and will be verified by history all over the world.

References:

1. China Net, July 1, 2001 news of Xinhua News Agency, “Comrade Jiang Zemin’s Speech in the Conference of Celebrating the 80th Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party.” http://www.tsmc.edu.cn/www/gljg/xcb/4-1-1.htm

2. People’s Net, Citing from the CCP History Research, 6th issue, 2001. “Liu Shaoqi’s General Political Line during the Transitional Period”: The CCP Central Committee held a work meeting on issues about transforming industry and commerce of capitalism into that of socialism. CCP Committee representatives from all provinces, cities and autonomous regions attended the meeting. Liu Shaoqi, chairman of NPC Standing Committee made a speech at the meeting, claiming that changing private-owned production materials into public property is the basis of Marxism-Leninism. http://www.people.com.cn/GB/33831/33839/30513/30518/2568764.html

3. Xinhua Net, “General Political Line during the Transitional Period”: The fundamental of this General Political Line is to change private-owned production materials under capitalism into public-owned ones under socialism. http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-09/01/content_1056710.htm

4. People’s Net, The birth of “May 4 Constitution” – Mao Zedong drafted the first Constitution of PRC in Zhejiang Province. http://www.npcnews.com.cn/gb/paper370/1/class037000003/hwz224711.htm

5. Xinhua Net, The second “Constitution of The People’s Republic of China” (1975) clearly stipulated, “We must adhere to the Chinese Communist Party’s basic line and policies in the whole socialism period, adhere to continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and enable our great homeland to forever march forward under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.” http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-02/18/content_1320280.htm

6. The Epoch Times website, “On the Chinese Communist Party’s History of Killing,” Part 7 of the Epoch Times editorials, The Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party, “Since 1949, the CCP has persecuted more than half the people in China. An estimated 50 million to 80 million people died of unnatural causes. This number exceeds the total number of deaths in both World Wars combined.” http://www.dajiyuan.com

7. Selections of Mao Zedong’s Articles on Information, page 182, published by Xinhua Publishing House, 1st edition, December 1983, http://academic.mediachina.net/xsqk_view.jsp?id=682

8. China Telecom website, “Comrade Chen Yi, a Proletarian Revolutionist” http://www.chinatelecom.com.cn/sxgz/20020531/00000162.html

9. The Epoch Times website, “Fool People with Lies and Make Despotic Rule, Compete for Power and Money and Reign with Terror, Part 6 of ‘June 4’ Massacre Special Compilations,” authored by Ao Tu. This was an article submitted for the “Red China’s Lies” global writing competition. http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/3/9/3/n369396.htm

10. Chinaredweb.com, Part 4 of a background information series, “The Whole Story of Deng Xiaoping’s Touring the South,” by Deng Xiaoping Theory Research Office, The School of Laws and Politics, Tianjin Institute of Technology. http://www.tjut.edu.cn:8080/redweb/bjzl_4.htm

11. The phrase of “tao guang yang hui” means “hiding one’s capacities and biding one’s time.” The following is the phrase’s dictionary explanation: It means hiding one’s capabilities and preventing them from being known. It was derived from “The Old Tang Dynasty History Book: Imperial Biographies, No.18, Part B, Emperor Xuan Zong.” The book said that Tang Dynasty Emperor Xuan Zong did not expose his talents, and did not talk much. When he was a child, all people in the Emperor Court believed that he was not smart. Later his brother accidentally noticed his talents, and then told his mother Queen Zheng Shi, who ordered his brother not to make it known. Later, Xuan Zong expectedly inherited the emperor position. In modern explanations of this phrase, the example of Liu Bei, a figure of “The Evolution of Three Kingdoms,” was often used. Before Liu became a king, because of his lack in military power, he pretended to attend a vegetable garden to show that he had no intention to compete with others, so as to pursue his ambition later. This was called “hiding one’s capacities and biding one’s time.” http://www.guoxue.com/shibu/24shi/oldtangsu/jtsml.htm

In “The Old Tang Dynasty History Book: Imperial Biographies, No.18, Part B, Emperor Xuan Zong.” Authored by Li Xu and others (in Later Jin Dynasty), “Ancient Article Treasure House” (yuan dian bao ku), Guoxue.net. http://www.guoxue.com/shibu/24shi/oldtangsu/jtsml.htm

12. People.com.cn, Information Office of the State Council, November 20, 2001, http://tw.people.com.cn/GB/14865/14922/859679.html

13. Govern the Country with Law – Laws and Regulations, April 19, 1993, “Circular of the State Council Concerning Organizational Structure,” The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, http://www.lawyer21.co.kr/lawchina/ch+ch/1/1-14.htm

14. Xinhua Daily Net, February 24, 2003 http://www.xhby.net/xhby/content/2003-02/24/content_206343.htm

15. People.com.cn, November 6, 2000, The Information Office of the State Council and the Ministry of Information Industry jointly issued “Interim Provisions for Administration of Internet Websites’ Publishing News,” http://www.people.com.cn/GB/channel5/28/20001107/302408.html

16. Xinhua Net, March 17, 2003. History and Function of the Information Office of the State Council, http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2003-03/17/content_782728.htm

17. Xinhua Net, Curriculum Vitae of Zhao Qizheng, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2002-03/05/content_300452.htm

18. The Information Office of the State Council has seven bureaus.

1st Bureau – Enhancing the China media’s reporting news overseas and press release, and providing services to foreign reporters for their gathering news in China. The Bureau Chief is Qian Xiaoqian.

2nd Bureau – Enhancing Chinese media’s reporting of international issues and its research on the statuses of the international media, and in charge of the exchange and cooperation with foreign media organizations. The Bureau Chief is Gu Yaoming.

3rd Bureau – Responsible for planning and organizing the making and publishing of books and videos that are targeted for circulation overseas, as well as comprehensive cultural exchange programs. The Bureau Chief is Guo Changjian.

4th Bureau – Studying the plan and ways for promoting China overseas, and being in charge of drafting important documents, reports, etc., which this bureau is held responsible for. The Bureau Chief is Li Chen.

5th Bureau – Making plans for the development of internet news, enriching the foreign language contents of important websites of Chinese government. The Bureau Chief is Qian Xiaoyu (as the adjunct chief).

6th Bureau – Supervising the provincial, municipal, and autonomous regions’ Information Office, and providing service to Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan reporters for their coming to Mainland China to gather news. The Bureau Chief is Tian Jin.

7th Bureau – Driving the work of introducing China’s human rights development status to foreign countries, and engaging the exchange and cooperation with foreign organizations in the area of human rights. The Bureau Chief is Dong Yunlong.

By the Information Office of the State Council, People.com.cn http://tw.people.com.cn/GB/14865/14922/859679.html

19. Beijing Spring Magazine, June 2001 Issue (No.97 Issue), “The Official Documents from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party regarding the Falun Gong Issue.” http://www.bjzc.org/bjs/bc/97/09

20. Snweb.cn (Information Center of People’s Daily), “News Front,” No. 11, 2002, “Using the Important ‘Three Representatives’ Thoughts to Drive the New Development of Foreign Propaganda,” Zhao Qizheng. http://www.snweb.com/gb/xw/2002/11/a1101002.htm

21. People’s Daily, October 25, 2004, page 9 http://www.ccyl.org.cn/study_think/file/xxysk20041025.htm

22. People’s Daily, February 27, 1999, page 1, “Jiang Zemin’s Speech on the National Conference for Foreign Media Propaganda in 1999,” http://www.people.com.cn/item/ldhd/Jiangzm/1999/huiyi/hy0002.html

23. People’s Daily, October 26, 1999, page 1, http://www.people.com.cn/item/ldhd/Jiangzm/1999/chufang/1999ofy/ofy020.html

24. China Radio International, on November 2, 2001, published what Guo Jinzhe, the Editor-in-Chief of China Radio International Have Learned from Foreign Propaganda Work, http://web10.cri.com.cn/special/2001/Nov/74702.htm

25. Report from People’s Daily website, “2000 China International Propaganda Conference,” January 25, 2000. http://web.peopledaily.com.cn/zdxw/19/20000125/200001251913.html

26. Report from China.org website, “Opening of China International Propaganda Conference,” January 13, 2001, http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2001/Jan/16914.htm

27. China Report Weekly Net, June 8, 2003, “The power of mouthpiece – view of media propagation across countries from international strategy perspective”, by Xia Lin, excerpt from Report of Chinese Media http://www.mlcool.com/html/01723.htm

28. People’s Net, “The International Media Environment that China is Facing” by Zhao Qizheng, from World Knowledge http://media.people.com.cn/GB/40628/3278733.html

29. Center of International Information Spreading in Tsinghua University website, April 17, 2005, “The Soft Power and Global Information Spreading”. This article was a condensed version of State Council Information Office director Zhao Qizheng’s speech at Tsinghua University on May 13, 2004 http://www.media.tsinghua.edu.cn/zxxw/2005-04-17/zxxw0-1-399.shtml

30. Center of International Information Spreading in Tsinghua University website, October 28, 2004, “Liu Yunshan: in memory of the 60th anniversary of Xinhua News Agency Launching International English Broadcasting.” http://www.media.tsinghua.edu.cn/xwll/2004-10-28/xwll0-9-177.shtml

31. Chinese Reporters, Vol. 2 of 2004, “Improve the Efficiency of Our Foreign Propaganda (III)”, by Xinhua News Agency’s “Research on Efficient Foreign Propaganda” research group http://203.192.6.68/2004/2/2-23.htm

32. Zhao Qizheng, “The International Media Environment that China is Facing”, reprint from Ministry of Foreign Affairs publication World Knowledge on website of Center of International Information Spreading in Tsinghua University http://www.media.tsinghua.edu.cn/xshy/2005-01-13/xshy0-14-239.shtml

33. Xinhua Net, April 13, 2004, “Deputy Director of the Information Office of State Council, Qian Xiaoqian Held a Press Conference.” http://news.xinhuanet.com/video/2004-04/13/content_1415777.htm

34. Hong Kong Wenhuipo, July 20, 2005, “Qian Xiaoqian Promotes Tibet without a Break”, by Peng Kailei http://www.wenweipo.com/news.phtml?news_id=HK0507200008&loc=LU&cat=230XZ&no_combo=1

35. Chinese Reporters, Vol. 2 of 2004, “Improve the Efficiency of Our Foreign Propaganda (III)”, by Xinhua News Agency’s “Research on Efficient Foreign Propaganda” research group http://203.192.6.68/2004/2/2-23.htm

36. China News Net, September 17, 2001, “Grand Opening of the First International Chinese Media Forum in Nanjing (with photos)” http://www.fcm.chinanews.com.cn/2001-09-18/2/257.html

37. Tongxin Net, July 11, 2003, “Closely Follows New Development of Globalized Economy, Strives to Create a New Environment of International Propaganda”, Author: Huang Qiongji from United Front Department of Huizhou City CCP Committee http://www.tongxin.org/j-sys-news/page/2003/711/2705_652.shtml

38. Zhongxin Net, September 23, 2003, “Chinese Media Forum Closes; Liu Zepeng Calls for Geographic Affinity to Create Business Opportunities” http://www.chinanews.com.cn/n/2003-09-23/26/349925.html

39. China Party Cadres’ Forum, Issue No. 5 of 2003, “Ideology Change in Post Cold-war Era”, Author: Wu Yurong, Ph.D. Candidate in class 2001 of CCP Central Party School’s Scientific Socialism major. http://www.ccps.gov.cn/yjsjy/bysxx.htm

40. China Party Cadres’ Forum, Issue No. 6 of 2002, “Strategy for China’s International Image in an Era of Media Globalization,” Author: Wu Yurong http://www.54479.com/54479/ReadNews.asp?NewsID=582&BigClassName=&BigClassID=18&SmallClassID=17&SpecialID=0

41. World Manager Weekly, http://www.icxo.com, January 14, 2004, “Analysis of the Current Development of Foreign Media Corporation,” http://www.icxo.com/news.jsp?newsid=64651

42. VOA Chinese, May 26, 2001, “Son of Media Mogul Rupert Murdoch Calls Falun Gong Apocalyptic Cult”, Reported by Ya Wei http://www.voa.gov/chinese/archive/worldfocus/mar2001/mon/0326018murdoch-chinagbtxt.htm

43. Zhejiang Online News Net, “Chapter 14 of Commentary on China News Dissemination – Administration of New Dissemination Technologies” http://www.cjr.com.cn/gb/node2/node26108/node30205/node194934/node195050/node195053/userobject7ai1637.html

44. China News Research Center, source: Cultural Study, “Criticizing Murdoch- Part 1,” Author: Yuan Aizhong http://cddc.net/shownews.asp?newsid=8060

45. China Media Information Net, “Brief Introduction to Phoenix Satellite TV Holdings Ltd.” http://www.cmni.com.cn/othres/xg/fhwsjj.htm

46. People’s Net, source: Beijing Youth Daily, “Liu Changle Still Going Strong after Eight Years at Phoenix TV,” Reporter: Wu Fei. http://media.people.com.cn/GB/40701/3108120.html

47. Xinhua Net, September 2, 2003, “Global Chinese Language Satellite TV – brand magic of Phoenix Satellite TV” http://news.xinhuanet.com/newmedia/2003-09/02/content_1058280_1.htm

48. Legal Daily, March 26, 2001, page 4, “Son of Rupert Murdoch Attacks Falun Gong” http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/gb/content/2001-03/26/content_15306.htm

49. People’s Net, source: Liberation Daily, March 26, 2001 http://www.people.com.cn/GB/other6902/2832/20010326/425397.html

50. Zhongxin Net, 09:45 on March 26, 2001, “Son of Media Mogul Murdoch Condemns Falun Gong”, reprint from Beijing Morning News

51. VOA Chinese, May 26, 2001, “Son of Media Mogul Rupert Murdoch Calls Falun Gong Apocalyptic Cult”, Reported by Ya Wei http://www.voa.gov/chinese/archive/worldfocus/mar2001/mon/0326018murdoch-chinagbtxt.htm

52. Baidu Encyclopedia Net: STAR Group Limited

STAR Group Limited is solely owned by News Corp., and it is the primary multi-platform media service provider in Asia. STAR broadcasts through over 50 channels to about 300 million people in 53 countries in seven languages. STAR channels include Star Chinese Channel, Star Plus, Xing Kong Wei Shi, Vijay, Phoenix Chinese, Channel [V]., ESPN, Star Sports, Star Gold, Star Movies, Star News, Star One, Star Utsav, Star World and Phoenix InfoNews. STAR also broadcasts programs of National Geographic, A1 and the History Channel. http://www.startv.com/big5/pressrm_intro.cfm?press_seq=841

53. Xinhua Net, January 8, 2004, “Media Administration Cases: Murdoch News Corp. China Strategy” http://news.xinhuanet.com/newmedia/2004-01/08/content_1266435.htm

54. Chinese Computer Technology Info Net, March 22, 2002, from Nan Fang Daily, “Phoenix Satellite TV Lands in China; Murdoch Star Group Limited Begins Broadcast Next Month” http://www.chinabyte.com/20020322/1603217.shtml

55. China Net, Zeng Qinghong resume: In 2002, he was a member of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee, and member of the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee. In December 2002, he was also the principal of Party School of the CCP Central Committee. http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2003/Mar/293702.htm

56. People’s Net, October 8, 2003, Rupert Murdoch: Value of the Culture Industry-Speech by Rupert Murdoch, Board Chairman and Chief Executive of News Corp. at the Party School of the CCP Central Committee. http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14677/22114/41180/41185/3015288.html

57. Xinhua Net, October 10, 2003, “Li Changchun Meets with Murdoch and Hopes More Cooperation between News Corp and China” http://news.xinhuanet.com/newmedia/2003-10/10/content_1116251.htm

58. Decree No. 44: Provisional Rules for Administration of Joint Ventures and Cooperative Enterprises of China and Foreign Countries Producing and Operating Radio and TV Programs.

Article 4, Chapter 1: “enterprises solely owned by foreign venture for making and operating radio and TV broadcasting programs are not permitted”

Item 5, Article 6, Chapter 2: “legal representative must be appointed by the Chinese government”

Item 6, Article 6, Chapter 2: “the Chinese partner must own no less than 51% of the total stock in a joint venture”

Article 12, Chapter 3: “joint venture enterprises can make special topic, special column, entertainment, cartoon and other radio and TV programs, but they must not make current affairs and political news or similar special feature programs or special column programs.”

State Administration of Radio, Film and Television Website, “Provisional Rules for Administration of Joint Ventures and Cooperative Enterprises of China and Foreign Countries Producing and Operating Radio and TV Programs” http://www.sarft.gov.cn/manage/publishfile/20/2274.html

59. Xinhua Net, March 7, 2005 report, source: State Administration of Radio, Film and Television Website, “Notice on Provisional Rules for Administration of Joint Ventures and Cooperative Enterprises of China and Foreign Countries Producing and Operating Radio and TV Programs” http://news.xinhuanet.com/newmedia/2005-03/07/content_2660086.htm

60. Xinhua Net, March 7, 2005 report, source: Morning News of Liberation Daily, “New Policy Comes Out: Foreign Film and TV Media can Only Open One Joint Venture Company http://news.xinhuanet.com/newmedia/2005-03/07/content_2660106.htm

61. Tian Jin: deputy head of State Administration of Radio, Film and Television: Together Promote the Partner Relationship between China and Southeast Asia Nation Union http://www.people.com.cn/GB/guoji/8212/36645/36653/2743636.html

62. China State Administration of Radio, Film and Television Website, July 13, 2005, Excerpt of Tian Jin’s speech at National Radio, Film and Television Overseas Work Meeting http://www.sarft.gov.cn/manage/publishfile/134/3185.html

63. BBC Chinese, September 19, 2005, “Murdoch Calls Beijing ‘distrustful’” http://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/trad/hi/newsid_4250000/newsid_4259500/4259566.stm

64. Economist, September 22, 2005, “News Corporation’s Troubles in China” http://www.economist.com/research/articlesBySubject/displayStory.cfm?story_id=4427632&subjectid=2743324&tranMode=none

65. China Net, December 28, 2004, “Basic Establishment of Three-tiered News Publication System of the Chinese Government” http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2004/Dec/741194.htm

66. The Epoch Times, January 17, 2001, “Zhang Kunlun Escaped from the Tiger’s Mouth: I was subjected to ‘Brainwashing’ in China” http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/1/1/17/n35847.htm

67. The Epoch Times, January 21, 2001, “World Journal: Zhang Kunlun Recounts Abuse in Prison” http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/1/1/21/n37851.htm

68. Chinese Embassy in Canada website, January 18, 2001, “Chinese Embassy Spokesperson on Zhang Kunlun’s Speech at Press Conference” http://www.chinaembassycanada.org/chn/xw/swgb/t27835.htm

69. Chinese Embassy in Australia website, “Chinese Embassy Spokesperson Speaks on January 28, 2005” http://www.chinaembassy.org.au/chn/zt/jpflg/t181529.htm

70. Document Sifatong [2003] No. 135, “Ministry of Justice Instruction on Reinforcing the Propaganda Work in Justice and Administrative System”, published on November 23, 2003. Attachment: Forced Labor Camp Media Interview Approval Form

71. Website of the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party Committee at North China Electric Power University, June 27, 2005, Notice about printing and distributing “Provisional regulation of reporting unexpected incidents occurring at North China Electric University.” http://www.ncepubj.edu.cn/xcb/tztg-show.asp?column_id=329&column_cat_id=1

72. Zhongxin Net, 15:37 on June 12, 2008, “China News Service Earthquake Report: Loves from Overseas Chinese Help Wenchuan Earthquake Victims to Survive”, source: China News Media Net http://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/news/2008/06-12/1279887.shtml

73. Dajiyuan Net, June 16, 2008 Sydney Time, “Sichuan Human Rights Advocate Huang Qi Charged for Holding State Secret Illegally.” http://www.epochtimes.com.au/gb/8/6/16/n2156695.htm

74. Clearwisdom Net, August 21, 2001, “The Press Conference and 265-hour Sit-In Protest in San Francisco” http://www.clearwisdom.net/emh/articles/2001/8/21/13061.html

75. website of Chinese Consulate General in San Francisco, August 27, 2001, “Spokesman of the Chinese Consulate General in San Francisco Made a Public Speech” http://www.chinaconsulatesf.org/chn/xw/t37894.htm

76. Sina Net, July 23, 2002, Xinhua News Agency report from Washington, DC on July 22: Chinese Embassy in US Spokesperson denounced “the argument that China is a global threat”.

77. Xinhua Net, “Human Rights White Paper published on March 30, 2004, a Milestone of China’s Human Rights Improvement” http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-03/30/content_1391278.htm

78. Xinhua Net, April 13, 2005. “China Published White Paper: China’s Human Rights Progress in 2004.” http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-04/13/content_2822125.htm

79. People’s Daily Overseas Edition, March 25, 2005, “Director of Information Office of State Council Zhao Qizheng: Striving to Introduce China to the World”, by Shen Xinggeng and Zhang Yongheng http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2005/Mar/820284.htm

80. Xinhua Net, March 30, 2005, “Zhao Qizheng: We Dare to Broadcast Live, Indicating Chinese Officials are of Good Caliber.” http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-03/30/content_2761635.htm

81. China Guangzhou Net, August 26, 2005. “Brief Analysis of Connections and Differences between Propaganda at Home and Overseas Propaganda”, by Ding Daishu http://www.guangzhou.gov.cn/node_530/node_533/2005-08/112504723766622.shtml

82. Chinese Reporters, Vol. 2 of 2004, “Improve the Efficiency of Our Foreign Propaganda (I)”, by Xinhua News Agency’s “Research on Efficient Foreign Propaganda” research group http://203.192.6.68/2004/2/2-18.htm

83. Communication Forum Net, November 14, 2003. “Thoughts on China’s International News Dissemination under the Climate of Globalization”, by Song Zhaoxun http://ruanzixiao.diy.myrice.com/qqhxzggjxwcbdcsk1114.htm

84. Chinese Government website, January 21, 2008, source: Xinhua News Agency, “Review of Our Country’s Propaganda and Culture Exchange Work Abroad Since the 16th National People’s Congress”, by Wei Wu http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2008-01/21/content_864524.htm

85. International Communications, June 2005, “What the Foreign Propaganda Personnel Need – Mastery of Artifices and Reducing the Tone of Propaganda”, by Tang Runhua, Head of Xinhua News Agency’s Research Institute. http://news.xinhuanet.com/newmedia/2005-07/06/content_3182686_1.htm

86. Chinese Reporters, Issue No. 5, 2008, “Reform and Renovate, Focus on Improving Media’s Guiding Role” http://www.chuanboxue.net/list.asp?Unid=4113

87. China News Net — “Information on Industry and Economics”, from China News Service “Brief Introduction on Foreign Newspapers.” http://www3.chinanews.com.cn:6666/wbyaolan.htm

88. Toutunhe District People’s Government website, from China News Service brief http://www.tth.gov.cn/1$001/1$001$007/1$001$007$008/article.jsp?articleid=2006-5-25-0015

89. Media – People’s Net, November 9, 2007, “Oversea Center of China News Service”, source: China News Media Net http://media.people.com.cn/GB/6508011.html

90. Zhongxin Net, October 12, 2006, “CNS Established Cooperation Relationship with US Asian Culture Media Group (with Photo)” http://www.heb.chinanews.com.cn/news/gatq/2006-10-12/9173.shtml

91. CRI Online, China Radio International http://gb.cri.cn/cri/gk.htm

92. Website of the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT), Reply of SARFT Spokesperson to Questions Raised by Journalists of South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), http://211.146.6.3/manage/publishfile/136/2300.html

93. Media magazine, Issue No. 9, 2005, “The Overall Packaging Path of CCTV-9 Channel”, by Wang Conghui

94. CCTV website: Brief introduction to CCTV-4 (international channel) http://sports.cctv.com/homepage/profile/04/index.shtml

95. People’s Net, “How to subscribe to People’s Daily Oversea Edition” http://bkdy.people.com.cn/dispnews.php?id=73

96. Xinhua Net, July 4, 2005, reprint report from China News Service on July 1 in Beijing, “The 20th Anniversary of Starting Publication of People’s Daily Overseas Edition, One of the Five Main Media for Overseas Propaganda” http://news.xinhuanet.com/newmedia/2005-07/04/content_3171046.htm

97. Website of Chinese Embassy in France, “China’s Main Overseas Media” http://fr.chineseembassy.org/chn/zgzfg/zgsg/xwc/zgmtfz/t154881.htm

98. Qinghai News Net, January 21, 2008, “Review of Our Country’s Propaganda and Culture Exchange Work Abroad Since the 16th National People’s Congress” http://www.qhnews.com/index/system/2008/01/21/002341459_02.shtml

99. Website of Foreign Affairs Office of Guangdong Provincial People’s Government, August 26, 2003. China’s State Council issued Document No. 47 “Regulation stipulations on Foreign Journalists and Foreign Media Outlets in China.” http://www.gdfao.gov.cn/lbxw/lb7/200308260014.htm

100. Tsinghua University website, “Chronicles of Fighting against SARS” http://www.tsinghua.edu.cn/docsn/shxx/site/chinac/liudb/sars/lanmu/jishi/

The exact time of SARS outbreak for Mr. Pang of Foshan City was the evening of November 16, 2002. He was hospitalized for the first time on November 20… He is probably the first SARS patient we are able to trace. On March 12, WHO issued the first global warning on the outbreak of SARS in some regions. On March 13, various media in Hong Kong reported pneumonia outbreak as headline news. Some even used the titles such as “Lethal pneumonia attacks on Hong Kong”, “Lethal virus variation spread in Asia”, “Pneumonia out of control, medical staff panic” and so on http://www.tsinghua.edu.cn/docsn/shxx/site/chinac/liudb/sars/lanmu/jishi/

101. Website of Chinese Embassy in Hungary, April 3, 2003

China’s Minister of Public Health Answering Questions from Journalists of Chinese and Foreign Media, “SARS Has Been Effectively Controlled”. http://www.chinaembassy.hu/chn/xwdt/t87779.htm

102. The Epoch Times, July 21, 2005, “SARS and Renouncing the Communist Party”, by Chen Yanhong http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/5/7/21/n993167.htm

103. Boxun Net, June 11, 2003, “Jiang Yanyong: People’s Interest is above Everything!” http://www.peacehall.com/news/gb/yuanqing/2003/06/200306110947.shtml

104. Sina Net, “Beijing: Typical Procedures during Outbreak of SARS” http://book.sina.com.cn/2003-07-01/3/10608.shtml

105. Great Wall On-line (Website of Information Office of Hebei Provincial People’s Government), September 12, 2003, “Exploring Greater Potential When We Make Breakthroughs in the Way We Think” http://www.hebei.com.cn/node2/node892/node1203/node1205/userobject1ai151908.html

106. Great Wall On-line (Website of Information Office of Hebei Provincial People’s Government), November 26, 2004.

Xiang Jinke, Deputy Head of Propaganda Department of Hebei Provincial CCP Committee and Director of Information Office of provincial government, gave a speech at the graduation ceremony of the first training session for News spokespersons of Hebei Province http://www.hebei.com.cn/node2/node1302/node1662/node1663/userobject1ai282510.html

107. Xinhua Net, January 18, 2005.

“With the arrangement of Information Office of the State Council, a journalist team composed of reporters from Xinhua News Agency, People’s Daily, China Radio International, China News Service, Hong Kong Wenweipo, Associated Press, and CNN interviewed the survivors of the ‘Self-immolation’ incident, Wang Jindong, Liu Yunfang, and one of the organizers for the ‘self-immolation’ incident Xue Hongjun, at Zhengzhou Prison on January 18,” by Tian Yu. http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-01/18/content_2478767.htm

108. The Epoch Times Website, February 12, 2005, “Falun Gong Suspects AP and Chinese Communist Regime Had Dark-Room Deals” http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/5/2/12/n810289.htm

109. Nan Fang Net, February 7, 2001. “Numerous Evidence Showed Western Journalists Involved in ‘Self-Immolation’ Incident by Falun Gong Followers” http://news.beelink.com.cn/20010207/403549.shtml

110. Wuhan University of Technology News Net, March 7, 2008, “Liu Qi: Study, Promote and Carry Out the Spirit of the 17th National People’s Congress So As to Open up a New Arena of Ideology Work” http://www.wutnews.net/politics/news.aspx?id=40823

111. The three books Broken Images: Essays on Chinese Culture and Politics, Chinese Shadows, and The Chairman’s New Clothes by Simon Leys are called “unavoidable cornerstones” in one’s observation of China. They changed the contemporary French view on China. “Simon Leys Who Changed Contemporary French View of China” in the May 30, 2002 issue of Beijing Spring Magazine. Author: Chen Yan in France. http://bjzc.org/bjs/bc/109/87

112. People’s Daily website: “Li Dan: Telling the World People Stories about China.” (Part One), interviewers: Wang Yongliang, Lan Lan http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14677/22114/37734/39157/2902998.html

113. People’s Daily website: “Li Dan: Telling the World People Stories about China.” (Part Three) – Seeking Experience from the Western World yet Brought Back Love for One’s Country http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14677/22114/37734/39157/2903011.html

114. People’s Daily website: “Li Dan: Telling the World People Stories about China.” (Part Four) – Creating a New Realm for News Reporting. http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14677/22114/37734/39157/2903028.html

115. Tianjin Foreign Trade Net, April 15, 2004, “Implementation Details for Intensifying Propaganda toward Foreign Countries”, by Foreign Propaganda Office of Tianjin City CCP Committee (Information Office of Tianjin City Government) http://www.goldentianjin.net.cn/kaifang/law20.htm

116. China Net: February 22, 2005, “Focal Point (Guidelines) on Radio, Film and Television Propaganda for 2005”, by State Administration of Radio, Film and Television http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/zhuanti/gzyd/792288.htm

117. State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) website, Tian Jin’s Biography: he became SARFT vice editor-in-chief in October 2001; SARFT vice editor-in-chief and CCP group member in August 2003; SARFT deputy director and CCP group member in August 2004 http://www.sarft.gov.cn/downstage/page_134_1.jsp

118. State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) webiste, August 2007, Wang Taihua http://www.chinasarft.gov.cn/catalog.do?catalogId=20070831104651450298

119. State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) website, February 6, 2008, “Speech at the National Conference for Directors of Radio, Film and TV Bureaus”, by Wang Taihua on January 27, 2008 http://www.sarft.gov.cn/articles/2008/02/06/20080205170642240530.html

120. National Translation Qualification Exam Training Website, December 23, 2004, “About us”, Education and Training Center of China Foreign Language Bureau http://www.wwjtraining.com/aboutus.asp?id=17

121. “Yang Zhengquan: A Rough Life Path Reveals His Wisdom in Media Work (Part 1)”

Yang Zhengquan’s Biography: In April 1993, he was promoted to deputy director of CCP Foreign Propaganda Office, deputy director of State Council Information Office, director and CCP group secretary of China Foreign Language Publishing and Distribution Administration. In July 2001, he was appointed standing vice chairman of the China Human Rights Development Foundation and vice chairman of the China Human Rights Research Society. He was the representative of CCP 15th National Congress, member of the National Politburo 10th Session, and the deputy director of Politburo’s Foreign Affair Committee. http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14677/22114/37734/39506/2922865.html

122. China Publisher Association website, “Fifty Years of International Press and Publication of the New China,” by Yang Zhengquan, [Editor’s note: The “new-born People’s Republic (of China)” refers to communist China after the CCP seized power in 1949] http://www.pac.org.cn/htm/nianjian/2000/50years/50-10.asp

123. Xinhua Net: Large-scale Foreign Propaganda magazine http://www.xinhuanet.com/newmedia/cmqk/dwdcb.htm

124. Xinhua Net, March 28, 2005, “How Can the News Publication Industry Adopt and Implement a Scientific Development Outlook”, by Yu Yongzhan http://news.xinhuanet.com/newmedia/2005-03/28/content_2753564.htm

125. National Career Training Material Net, “Government Pays the Bill for Translation Fee for the First Time. ‘Walk Out’ Gets Strong Push,” http://www.cott.org.cn/newsdetail.cfm?iCntno=5244

126. Website of Chinese News Research Center. “Innovation and Development of the Publication Industry,” http://www.cddc.net/shownews.asp?newsid=9429

127. People’s Net, “A Colorful and Boundless Land of Culture—Sidelights of 1999 Paris-China Culture Week,” by Yang Xuefeng and Niu Tingtao, September 18, 2001 http://www.sd-china.com/communion/communion-4.htm

128. Jiangsu of China Net, February 5, 2004 “Zhao Qizheng, Telling the World about China.” http://news.jschina.com.cn/gb/jschina/news/show/chinesetime/userobject1ai434967.html

129. Shanghai Official Website of Chinese-French Cultural Year, “The Evening of Beijing and Paris: Chinese and French Performing Artists Hand in Hand (Photo report)” http://www.cfcy.sh.gov.cn/epublish/gb/paper178/1/class017800001/hwz649639.htm

130. People’s Net, November 20, 2005, speech by Guo Ke, Vice-president of School of Journalism and Communication, Shanghai International Studies University, http://www.tech.net.cn/sace/inter/6889.shtml

131. Sina Net, October 13, 2003, “Exposition of Psychological Studies of Audience of China’s Overseas Propaganda”, by Guo Ke http://tech.sina.com.cn/other/2003-10-13/1647243344.shtml

132. China Net, October 26, 2005, “What has ‘Chinese-French Culture Year’ brought us?” by Chen Weiyuan, senior editor from Foreign Expert Bureau, Source: Large-scale Foreign Propaganda magazine

133. Jiangsu Prison Net, March 22, 2004, “How the taboo in human rights area was broken — an unusual publishing experience of mine” by Wang Mi, editor of Sichuan People’s Publishing Company http://www.jsjy.gov.cn/newsfiles/34/2005-01/4102.shtml

134. China Net and People’s Daily, March 15, 2004, by Dong Yunhu. http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/OP-c/516604.htm

135. China Youth Science and Technology Info Net : A Brief Introduction of Dong Yunhu http://cyc7.cycnet.com:8090/fair/bolanhui/person/person_content.jsp?p_id=632&a_id=136

136. People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Website, November 7, 2000. “Chinese Government signed ‘International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’” http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/ziliao/wjs/2159/t9004.htm

137. Kesi Platform Net, “Almanac of China’s Internet News Reports between 1995 and 2002”, http://www.kserp.com/ks_shownews.asp?newsid=1329

138. Zhejiang Online, “Chapter Four of Comments of Journalism and Communication in China – Management of New Techniques in Communication”, http://www.cjr.com.cn/gb/node2/node26108/node30205/node194934/node195050/node195053/userobject7ai1637.html

139. Nan Fang Net, October 10, 2003. “Fully Exert Our Advantages and Strengthen Foreign Propaganda.” Paper published on “2003 China’s Internet Media Forum,” by Zhang Hong, responsible person for CRI Online. http://www.southcn.com/news/gdnews/zgwllt/lw/200310100966.htm

140. Jiangsu of China Net, “Sadness and Happiness: Retrospect on The Past Five Years of China’s Internet Media Industry,” reprint from International Media Circles, 4th issue of year 2000, page 27.

http://review.jschina.com.cn/gb/jschina/news/xzzj/node1490/userobject1ai12863.html

141. Investigation records: Information Office of the State Council Makes Use of Websites of Overseas Embassies to Carry on Anti-Falun Gong Brainwashing Propaganda. For example:


The Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Canada website,

Consulate General of the People’s Republic of China in San Francisco website,

Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Switzerland website,

Consulate-General of the People’s Republic of China in Sydney website,

Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in New Zealand website,

Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Hungary website, and so on

http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/ziliao/wzzt/2295/default.htm

142. China Internet Information Center, Nov. 14, 2003, “News Website Construction and Development,” by Information Office of State Council, http://www.cnnic.net.cn/html/Dir/2003/11/14/1302.htm

143. Communication Forum net, news from China Media Reports (Hong Kong), the 1st issue of 2003, “The State Security during Media Globalization and Viewing Media’s Cross Border Broadcast From the International Strategic Perspective” (Xia Lin, vice-chief-editor of Xinhua News Agency, senior reporter) http://ruanzixiao.diy.myrice.com/cmqxhsddgjaq.htm

Footnote: Please refer to another WOIPFG investigation report, “Overseas Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party Central Community is the Leading Center for the Slanderous Propaganda in the Persecution of Falun Gong.”

http://www.zhuichaguoji.org/cn/index2.php?option=content&task=view&id=510&pop=1&page=0